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I. INTRODUCTION
Intricate issues of contract law stem from a rather plain question: is one party, suspecting that the
other party will not fulfill his obligations in compliance with the terms of the contract, entitled,
prior to the date agreed upon for performance, to suspend his own performance and demand
additional guarantees, or even to avoid the contract?
International uniform law envisages a number of situations in which a breach is said to have
occurred prior to the time agreed upon for performance. In the area of international sales
contracts, arts. 71, 72, and 73(2) of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (hereafter ” CISG” ), applicable to both the buyer and the seller, lay
down, on the one hand, the situations in which an anticipatory breach is deemed to have occurred
and, on the other hand, the remedies available to the aggrieved party. In other words, these
provisions designate the circumstances in which, even though no breach of contract has yet been
committed and the time for performance of the obligation has not yet elapsed, a party may, in
order to protect his own interests, temporarily stop complying with his contractual obligations or
completely free himself from those obligations. In this respect, arts. 71, 72, and 73(2) CISG differ
from arts. 49 and 64 CISG, which govern the right of the aggrieved party to avoid the contract
when performance is overdue, that is when the other party has actually committed a fundamental
breach of contract.
Art. 71 and art. 72 CISG differ in their purpose, their conditions of application, and the solutions
that they provide. Art. 72 CISG is based on the Anglo-American doctrine of anticipatory breach
and authorizes the innocent party to declare the contract avoided, without the need to wait until
the breach materializes on the date when performance is due, if it is clear that the other party will
commit a fundamental breach of contract. Art. 71 CISG, on the other hand, merely authorizes the
innocent party to suspend performance if it becomes apparent that the other party will not
perform a substantial part of his obligations. In other words, whereas art. 72 CISG is aimed at the
termination of the contractual relationship and the release of the parties of their obligations, art.
71 CISG is aimed at keeping the contract intact and on foot. Art. 73(2) CISG, in turn, deals with
the issue of anticipatory breach in the specific context of installment contracts.
The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (hereafter ” UNIDROIT
Principles” ) and the Principles of European Contract Law (hereafter ” PECL” ), represent, like the
CISG, attempts to ” promote the unification and/or harmonization of international commercial
law.” 1 Today, at the international and European level, the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL
respectively constitute, in the field of transnational commercial contracts, the two sources of non-
binding or soft law2 most commonly referred to. These two sets of Principles are largely inspired
by the CISG. Indeed, the Governing Council of UNIDROIT recognized, in its introduction to the
UNIDROIT principles, that ” to the extent that the UNIDROIT Principles address issues also
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covered by the CISG, they follow the solutions found in that Convention.” 3 In fact, the CISG was
” an obligatory point of reference in the preparation of the UNIDROIT Principles.” 4 Similarly, the
CISG was, for the drafters of the PECL, ” a particularly fruitful source of ideas.” 5 With these
considerations in mind, the present study will attempt, beyond the boundaries of comparative
analysis, to draw conclusions regarding the impact of the CISG, with respect to the issue of
anticipatory breach, on both the UNIDROIT Principles, and the PECL.
II. SUSPENSION OF PERFORMANCE
1. Purpose and Rationale of the Rule
Granting one party the right to declare himself released from his contractual obligations whenever
he suspects that his contracting partner will breach the contract would contradict two of the main
aims the CISG is striving to achieve –  on the one hand, that of keeping international commercial
contracts intact as long as possible so as to promote good faith, loyalty, and seriousness in
international transactions, and, on the other hand, that of avoiding an overload of transnational
litigation. Nevertheless, the drafters of the CISG considered that the party who is under the
contractual obligation of performing the contract first or under the obligation of performing
preparatory acts, deserves protection if it is highly likely that the other party will not perform a
substantial part of his obligations. Indeed, the drafters believed that if it appears that one party will
not perform his obligations, ” it would be inappropriate for the other party to be required to
continue with his performance of the contract, which could result in his suffering an irrevocable
loss.” 6 Thus, in particular, the seller who has agreed to deliver goods on credit ought to be
protected in cases in which, prior to the time of delivery, the buyer becomes insolvent or has
otherwise manifested that he is unable to pay for the goods. Similarly, the buyer who has agreed
to pay the price of the goods prior to their delivery ought to be protected in cases in which, prior
to the time of payment, the seller’s insolvency or some other circumstance makes it apparent that
he will not deliver the goods.
Consequently, the drafters have agreed that if it is highly likely that one party will commit a
substantial breach of contract (but not necessarily a fundamental breach in the sense of art. 25
CISG), art. 71 CISG should protect the other party by authorizing him to suspend performance.
In other words, the party –  buyer or seller -whose interests are threatened by the other party’s
potential failure to comply with his contractual or conventional obligations may be temporarily
released from his obligation to perform the contract.
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2. Grounds for Suspension & Types of Performances Subject to Suspension
a. Grounds for Suspension of Performance
According to art. 71(1) CISG, ” a party may suspend the performance of his obligations if, after the
conclusion of the contract, it becomes apparent that the other party will not perform a substantial
part of his obligations as a result of: (a) a serious deficiency in his ability to perform or in his
creditworthiness; or (b) his conduct in preparing to perform or in performing the contract.”  Thus,
the parameters, under art. 71 CISG, on which the right of the innocent party to suspend
performance of his obligations depend, are the following: (i) the fact that it becomes apparent that
a breach will be committed, closely linked to the issue of the degree of certainty that the said
breach will occur; (ii) the magnitude of the future breach; and (iii) the various possible indicia that
the breach will be committed.
Regarding parameter (i), as stated above, art. 71(1) CISG provides that ” a party may suspend the
performance of his obligations if, after the conclusion of the contract, it becomes apparent that the other
party will not perform a substantial part of his obligations”  (emphasis added). The incapacity to
perform must be objectively recognizable;7 in other words, a neutral observer of the concerned
international commercial branch, in the same circumstances, would conclude that there are
” objective grounds showing substantial probability of non-performance.” 8 Indeed, ” the apparent
inability to perform must not only induce subjective fears with regard to the performance of the
contract but it must also enable objective observers to foresee non-performance.” 9 In sum, art. 71
CISG requires, on the one hand, that an objective and reasonable observer would conclude that
it is highly likely that one party will fail to perform a substantial part of his obligations10 and, on
the other hand, that ” the party wishing to suspend performance could hold [the relevant
information] to be true. If the party suspending performance could hold the information available
to be true, the risk falls to the other party.” 11
Provided, as required under art. 71 CISG, that the incapacity to perform has become apparent
only after the conclusion of the contract, the innocent party may suspend performance of his
obligations even if the circumstances that caused the said incapacity already existed at the time of
the conclusion of the contract.12 Indeed, ” the aim of the proposal that led to the present
formulation was to permit a suspension of performance even when the circumstances that made
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obligations from insisting on performance by the other party, maintaining that his situation had not deteriorated after the
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Canadian delegate, there is not even an appreciable difference between the formulation ” it becomes apparent”  and ” good
grounds to conclude that the other party will not perform”  (see A/Conf. 97/C.1/SR.38 at 2 § 8 (= O.R. 433); see also
A/Conf.97/C.1/SR.37 at 12 § 104 (= O.R. 432)).
20 Honnold, supra note 7, at 430.
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the obligor’s performance doubtful had existed before, but had not become apparent until after
the conclusion of the contract.” 13 If it was already apparent at the conclusion of the contract that
one party would not be able to perform, the other party may not suspend performance.14 ” If those
circumstances were generally apparent but not in fact known by the party wishing to suspend
performance, it is not clear whether the article would be held to be applicable, but probably it
would be held not to be.” 15 Indeed, given, on the one hand, the duty of each party, at the time of
the conclusion of the contract, to examine the creditworthiness of the other party, and, on the
other hand, the fact that the incapacity to perform must be objectively recognizable, it seems that
the right to suspend performance should not be available if one party’s defective economic
situation was generally apparent but not in fact known to the other party.16 ” A party would have
the right to suspend performance only if he was aware of the bad economic situation of the other
party at the conclusion of the contract and can prove that the other party’s economic situation
considerably worsened.” 17
The text of the Convention does not provide specific criteria for determining the degree of
certainty required for reaching the conclusion that a party ” will not”  perform a substantial part of
his obligations. Nevertheless, given that the applicability of art. 71(1) CISG is to be founded on
objective considerations, ” strictly construed, the language of the article seems to require that the
likelihood of the apprehended non-performance amount to a virtual certainty by normal business
standards.” 18 Absolute certainty is however not a requirement under art. 71 CISG. First, ” it must
be remembered that the cases in which it can be stated with absolute certainty that a particular
” deficit”  will lead to an inability to perform are very infrequent.” 19 The party seeking suspension
is frequently incapable of assessing precisely the probability that a non-performance will occur, but
he is merely in a position to assert, based on a party-subjective appreciation of the circumstances,
that it is likely that such non-performance will occur. Second, ” circumstances that make it
‘apparent’ that the other party will not perform need not establish a certainty of non-performance
since the initial appearance may be modified by clarification of the situation or by the removal of
the initial barriers to performance,” 20 given adequate assurance of performance may be provided
(see article 71(3) CISG, infra II.4). Third, one should note that, as discussed in detail hereafter
(infra II.6.), the degree of certainty that a breach will be committed, required under art. 71 CISG,
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24 Bennett, supra note 6, at 519.
25 Schlechtriem, supra note 9, at 94.
26 See GERMANY OLG Hamm, 23 June 1998, 19 U 127/97 (CLOUT case No. 338), available online at
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980623g1.html> and SWITZERLAND ZHK Arbitral award No. 273/95, supra note 22.
27 Enderlein/Maskow, supra note 7, at 286-287.
28 Enderlein/Maskow, supra note 7, at 286-287.
29 See AUSTRIA Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court], 12 February 1998, 2 Ob 328/97t (CLOUT case No. 238),
available online at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980212a3.html>, according to which art. 71(1)(a) CISG covers cases
in which a party is subject to an insolvency proceeding or has completely ceased to pay but not in which payment is slow.
30 See BELGIUM Tribunal Commercial [District Court] Bruxelles, 13 November 1992, A.R. 2700/90, available online at
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/921113b1.html>, which recognizes the applicability of the
Convention and the right of the seller to suspend delivery because the buyer failed to pay the price under a prior contract,
but which fails to cite art. 71 CISG.
31 Neumayer/Ming, supra note 10, at 460.
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is lower than the degree of certainty required under art. 72 CISG, which provides for avoidance
of the contract in case of anticipatory (fundamental) breach. In conclusion, art. 71 CISG does not
require absolute certainty that a breach will occur.
As to the magnitude of the breach (parameter (ii)), art. 71(1) CISG requires, in order for one party
to be entitled to suspend performance of his obligations, that it becomes apparent that the other
party will fail to perform ” a substantial part of his obligations.”  The right to suspend depends on
how important the obligation is to the party relying on it.21 Nevertheless, as a general rule, the
” performance of ‘relatively minor’ (cf. 320(2) German Civil Code) obligations may not be forced
by suspending one’s own performance.” 22 As explained below (infra II.6.), it is however not
necessary that the suspected breach be fundamental in the sense of art. 25 CISG.23 In other words,
art. 71 CISG ” enables the Convention to provide for a party to suspend performance where the
other party’s breach, while substantial, may not be sufficiently fundamental to justify avoidance.” 24
The importance, for the obligee, of the jeopardized obligation must however have been
recognizable to the obligor at the time of the conclusion of the contract.25
Finally, as to the various possible indicia that a breach will be committed (parameter (iii)),
art. 71(1)(a) CISG mentions, in the first place, a ” serious deficiency in [the] ability to perform.” 26
Such deficiency can relate to both the seller and the buyer. The cause of the deficiency is
irrelevant; it does not have to be the result of anybody’s fault nor does anybody have to be
responsible for it.27 ” There may be a deficiency in the ability of a party to perform a contract even
if the party’s financial situation is excellent.” 28 The said deficiency may be either subjective (for
example insolvency,29 non-performance of other parallel contracts,30 or expiration of a license) or
objective (for example forthcoming strike, fire in the manufacturer’s factory, official public order
having an impact on the contract or its performance, such as the prohibition to export currency
from the buyer’s country or embargo measures).31 A deficiency in the buyer’s ability to perform,
for instance, ” can be the result of a FOB business where there is insufficient storage room on
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34 GERMANY OLG Hamm, 19 U 127/97, supra note 26; AUSTRIA OLG Linz, 23 May 1995, 1R 64/95-34, available
online at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950523a3.html>, see also AUSTRIA OGH, 6 February 1996, 10 Ob 518/95
(CLOUT case No. 176) (Aus.), available online at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960206a3.html>.
35 See AUSTRIA OGH, 2 Ob 328/97t, supra note 29.
36 Chengwei, supra note 11, § 9.2.
37 Chengwei, supra note 11, § 9.2. See also HUNGARY Arbitration Court of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of
B u d a p e s t ,  A r b i t r a l  a w a r d  V B / 9 4 1 2 4 ,  1 7  N o v e m b e r  1 9 9 5 ,  a v a i l a b l e  o n l i n e  a t
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opened with a date that had already expired); CHINA International Economic & Trade Arbitration Commission, Arbitral
award CISG/1996/11, 27 February 1996, available online at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960227cl.html>.
38 See BELGIUM Rechtbank [District Court] van Koophandel Hasselt, 1 March 1995, A.R. 3641/94, available online at
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950301b1.html>, and BELGIUM Tribunal Commercial Bruxelles, A.R. 2700/90,
supra note 30 (not citing art. 71), which found the seller entitled to suspend his obligations given the buyer’s seven-month
delay in payment, respectively non-payment, of the price under earlier sales contracts.
39 Chengwei, supra note 11, § 9.2.
40 The following cases cite subparagraph (b): NETHERLANDS Rb [District Court] 's Hertogenbosch, 9981/HAZA 95-2299,
2 October 1998, available online at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/
wais/db/cases2/981002n1.html>; HUNGARY Arbitration Court attached to the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and
Industry,  Arbitra l  award  Vb 94131 ,  5  December 1995 (CLOUT case No.  164) ,  avai lable  onl ine at
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/951205h1.html>; GERMANY LG Berlin, 52 S 247/94, supra note 23.
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board a ship.” 32 A deficiency in the seller’s ability to perform may be made apparent, for example,
by recurrent delays in deliveries in violation of mandatory contractual deadlines, or by the delivery
of damaged goods to the buyer or even to third parties if the existence of the defects causes serious
doubts regarding the performance of the contract, for example if the defects indicate a lack of
command of the technique required.33 In Germany, the buyer was found to be entitled to suspend
his obligations on the basis of the seller’s inability to deliver goods free of restrictions imposed by
the seller’s supplier.34
The ” serious deficiency in [a party’s] creditworthiness,”  mentioned in art. 71(1)(a) CISG as a
second possible circumstance that may make it apparent that that a breach will be committed,35
” should be interpreted broadly and cover the event where the economic situation of a guarantor
or provider of a guarantee deteriorates.” 36 Just like the deficiency in a party’s ability to perform, a
deficiency in creditworthiness can relate to both parties: ” not only to the buyer who is obligated to
pay the price of the goods, but also to the seller who may find himself incapable of financing
manufacture of the sold goods. The creditworthiness of the buyer may even play a role when he is
the one to perform first, e.g., in the case of advance payment or the opening of a letter of credit.” 37
A serious deficiency in the buyer’s creditworthiness can become manifest, for example, through
delays in or the absence of payments due with respect to other orders.38 If, as a result of this
deficiency, it becomes apparent that the buyer will not be able to pay the price of the goods that
are to be delivered by virtue of the contract in question, the seller is released from his obligation
to manufacture and/or deliver those goods. ” However, a deficiency in the creditworthiness of the
buyer is no reason for suspending performance when the financial situation of the buyer has not
changed since the conclusion of the contract and when there are growing doubts on the part of
the seller in regard to setting the buyer a time limit for payment.” 39
Art. 71(1)(b) CISG refers to the defaulting party’s ” conduct in preparing to perform or in
performing the contract.” 40 This paragraph is to be understood in the light of arts. 32 and 34
CISG, on the one hand, regarding the seller’s obligations, and arts. 54, 60, and 65 CISG, on the
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46 Bennett, supra note 6, at 520.
47 Honnold, supra note 7, at 427.
48 Enderlein/Maskow, supra note 7, at 284.
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other hand, regarding the buyer’s obligations. Indeed, not only the contract, but also the
Convention, may impose the performance of preliminary acts, such as the making of shipment
arrangements (art. 32 CISG), the handing over of documents (art. 34 CISG), the opening of a
letter of credit (art. 64 CISG), or the supplying of specifications for goods (art. 65 CISG).41 Thus,
the following have, for instance, been held to fall under art. 71(1)(b) CISG: a promisor's supply of
non-conforming goods in the current contract,42 a failure to provide a bank guarantee as agreed,43
and the non-payment of the price.44 Furthermore, the conduct referred to in art. 71(1)(b) CISG
” may also refer to the fulfillment of other contracts . . . and is independent of the financial
situation...It may also cover the use of certain unfitting raw materials in performing obligations
under similar contracts.” 45 For example, ” a buyer who has contracted for precision parts, which he
intends to use immediately upon delivery, may discover that, although there has been no
deterioration in the seller's ability to perform and deliver parts of the quality required, defective
deliveries are being made to buyers with similar needs. If the reason for these defective deliveries
is that the seller has been using raw material from a particular source and if the seller is proposing
to use material from that source for the contract in question, the buyer will be entitled to suspend
his performance.” 46 In sum, the failure to perform necessary preliminary acts may constitute, in
compliance with art. 71(1)(b) CISG, a valid ground for suspension of performance, by the
innocent party, of his obligations. In certain circumstances, the failure mentioned in
art. 71(1)(b) CISG may even constitute a breach of contract sufficiently fundamental to entitle the
aggrieved party to avoid the contract (arts. 49(1)(a) and 64(1)(a) CISG) or to initiate the Nachfrist
procedure (arts. 47(1) and 63(1) CISG). Nevertheless, even in such cases, if the aggrieved party still
wishes to pursue performance of the contract or if the grounds for avoidance of the contract are
unclear, suspension of his own performance rather than avoidance of the contract remains
available to this party,47 provided that this choice is not more detrimental to the defaulting party
(see infra II.6.).
b. Types of Performances Subject to Suspension
Art. 71 CISG ” relates to any party and any obligation.” 48 If the conditions of art. 71 CISG are
satisfied, both (advance) performance of the contract and acts regarding preparation of the
performance of the contract, imposed by the contract itself or by the Convention, may be
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51 Enderlein/Maskow, supra note 7, at 284.
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53 Enderlein/Maskow, supra note 7, at 284.
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suspended by the innocent party, buyer or seller,49 provided that there is a reciprocal relationship
between the obligation suspended and the counter-performance.50 Indeed, ” what are required are
not only acts in performance of the contract, but also those in preparation of performance which,
therefore, can also be suspended” 51. Thus, the seller is entitled not only to delay the delivery (arts.
31-34 CISG) but also to interrupt the manufacture of the goods or their procurement if he
becomes aware of the buyer’s impending insolvency or if it simply becomes apparent that the
buyer will not pay the price. Similarly, the buyer may not only delay the payment of the price but
also suspend the establishment of a letter of credit (arts. 54-59 CISG) or the organization of the
taking over of the goods (art. 60 CISG) if, for example, it becomes apparent that the seller will not
deliver the goods, or if the seller has been delivering defective goods to other buyers with similar
needs, using raw material from a particular source that the seller intends to use also for the
contract in question. More precisely, in cases of deficiency in the seller’s ability to perform, ” by
suspending performance the buyer will render it unnecessary to make a prepayment, to establish
a letter of credit to cover the price of future deliveries or to take preliminary steps such as the
making of shipping arrangements or the handing over of documents.” 52 Furthermore, one may
hold that art. 71 CISG also allows the suspension of the seller’s obligation to deliver substitute
goods under art. 46 CISG, i.e., an obligation which presupposes an earlier breach of contract.
Indeed, ” it is quite logical to include the obligation to deliver substitute goods if it has become
doubtful as a consequence that the price will be paid.” 53
In conclusion, the remedies available to the innocent party, under art. 71 CISG, are limited to
suspension of performance of the contract (including, for the seller, the obligation to deliver
substitute goods), and suspension of performance of duties to be fulfilled in preparation of
performance of the contract. The seller, for example, is not authorized to dispose of goods held for
the buyer, nor is the buyer authorized to purchase goods to replace those that ought to be
provided by the seller.54 According to art. 75, such remedies are available solely when the contract
has been avoided.
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3. Prevention of the Handing Over of Goods Already Dispatched
a. Right of the Seller to Stop Goods in Transit
Unlike the first paragraph of art. 71 CISG, applicable to both the seller and the buyer, the second
paragraph of the same provision55 only relates to the seller.56 This paragraph deals with cases in
which, after the goods have been dispatched, it becomes apparent (or, as the law formulates,
” evident” ) that the buyer will not perform his obligation to pay the price. The seller is authorized
to suspend performance of his obligation to deliver the goods by preventing the carrier from
handing them over to the buyer, even if the buyer holds a document, such as an ocean bill of
lading, which entitles him to obtain them and even if they were originally sold on terms granting
the buyer credit after receipt of the goods.57 Clearly, the provision is useful only if, on the one
hand, the threat of non-payment is discovered after the goods have been dispatched but before
they are handed over, and, on the other hand, ” the seller has not retained control over the goods,
as by the retention of a negotiable bill of lading (art. 58(2))” .58
The right to stop goods in transit ” is available without regard to whether risk of loss has passed to
the buyer.” 59 The general rules on the transfer of the risk to the buyer provide the following: if the
contract of sale involves carriage of the goods, the risk passes at the time when the goods are
handed over to the first carrier (art. 67(1) CISG); in respect of goods sold in transit, the risk passes
to the buyer at the time of the conclusion of the contract (art. 68 CISG); in cases that do not fall
within arts. 67 and 68 CISG, the risk passes to the buyer when he takes over the goods (art. 69 ab
initio CISG). Such rules do not affect the right of the seller, if the conditions of art. 71(2) CISG
are satisfied, to prevent the handing over of the goods to the buyer. Indeed, first, the object of the
provisions on the passing of the risk and that of art. 71(2) CISG differ: the rules on the passing of
the risk concern cases of accidental loss of or damage to the goods, whereas art. 71(2) CISG
addresses situations in which it appears that the buyer will not be able to pay the price. Thus, the
circumstances leading to the passing of the risk to the buyer are independent from those in which
the seller has a right to suspend performance of his obligation to deliver the goods (obligation
which the seller is capable of performing but voluntarily decides not to perform). Second, art.
71(2) and the provisions on the passing of the risk are to be considered complementary provisions:
if, after the time defined under arts. 67(1), 68, or 69 CISG as the time when the risk passes to the
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buyer, it becomes apparent that the buyer will not pay the price of the goods purchased, the
provisions on the transfer of the risk only compel the buyer to pay the price, but do not grant any
direct protection to the seller. Indeed, by stating that the risk is transferred to the buyer for
example when the goods are handed over to the first carrier or at the time the contract is
concluded, arts. 67 and 68 CISG only provide that, after this point in time, even if the goods are
accidentally damaged or lost, the buyer is compelled to pay their price; but arts. 67(1), 68, and 69
CISG do not grant the seller the right to take measures to ensure that the buyer will pay the sum
due, nor do these provisions provide any remedy in case the payment never occurs. Consequently,
art. 71(2) and the provisions on the passing of the risk must be read in conjunction: after the time
defined as the time when the risk passes to the buyer, the latter is bound by the obligation to pay
the price; additionally, if it appears that the buyer will not perform his obligation, the seller may
instruct the carrier not to hand the goods over to the buyer. ” For similar reasons domestic rules
that ” property”  or ” title”  has passed to the buyer may not undermine the narrow and specific
rights conferred by Article 71(2).” 60 Such issues are excluded from the scope, ratione materiae, of
the Convention (art. 4(b) CISG).
b. Limitation of the Impact of the Seller’s Instructions
Art. 71(2) in fine CISG indicates that this paragraph ” relates only to the rights in the goods as
between the buyer and the seller.”  In other words, the seller’s right to prevent delivery of the goods
to the buyer neither impairs the rights of third persons to whom the buyer has resold the goods or
who have obtained title in the goods, nor does it affect the relationship between the carrier and
the buyer.
First, under the CISG, ” the seller loses the right to order the carrier not to hand over the goods if
the buyer has transferred the document to a third party who has taken it for value and in good
faith.” 61 The relationship between the buyer and his obligee remains intact.62 The applicable
domestic rules protecting the property rights of good faith purchasers determine whether the said
third party has acquired rights in the goods overriding the seller’s right, under the CISG, to
prevent delivery to the buyer.63 In this respect, ” the most common situation referred to in art. 71
is the case in which the goods are in transit. In such circumstances there is a common law
institution called ‘stoppage in transitu’ which the seller can use when the buyer has delivered the
documents to a third person. This is clear from the formulation of art. 71 which emphasizes that
‘the present paragraph relates only to the rights in the goods as between the buyer and the seller.’
The view is held that in such cases the seller cannot claim the goods from a third party on the
basis of the Convention, but he might do so under the applicable national law.” 64 In other words,
the seller may exercise his rights against third parties only if domestic rules on secured transactions
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permit it.65 In this respect, Honnold nonetheless states that ” even a third party who holds
documents that control delivery may not have rights under domestic law that would cut off the
seller’s right to the goods. The essential point is that domestic law can be expected to honor the
seller’s rights against the buyer established by article 71(2) CISG and give the seller as much
protection against third persons as domestic law accords to other persons in the seller’s
position.” 66
Second, the seller’s right to stop the goods in transit does not affect the relationship between the
carrier and the buyer, and ” whether the carrier or warehouse keeper must follow the seller’s order
depends on the freight or warehouse contract, hence, on domestic law.” 67 Indeed, the question
whether the carrier is obligated or allowed to follow the instructions of the seller where the buyer
holds a document which entitles him to claim them is governed by the terms of the contract
concluded for carriage as well as the appropriate law of the form of transport in question.68 Under
the CISG, there is no obligation compelling the carrier to comply with the seller’s request for
stoppage.69 Consequently, the carrier may be precluded, given his obligations under municipal and
international law, from withholding the goods from the buyer. In such circumstances, the effective
operation of art. 71(2) CISG could be quite limited.70 If the carrier and the seller are bound by a
contractual relationship, ” giving relevant orders to the carrier or forwarding agent in question” 71
remains the only available device for the seller to exercise his right to stoppage and thus prevent
the handing over of the goods to the buyer. ” Otherwise, [the seller] would have to call in a
court.” 72 ” If the buyer’s country has acceded to the CISG, or if the domestic rules of that country
also provide for a right to stop the goods in transit, the seller may try to enforce this right through
the courts, e.g. by ways of distress or temporary injunction.” 73 Otherwise, if the carrier voluntarily
stops the goods in transit, he may expose himself to a claim for damages from the buyer.74
Consequently, to protect the carrier, the seller should require the buyer to deliver the documents
to the seller or to the carrier75 (see arts. 62 and 71(2) CISG), or directly, on the basis of the right
to stop performance, request the buyer not to take measures against the carrier.76
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4. Notice of Suspension and Adequate Assurance of Performance
a. Notice of Suspension
According to art. 71(3) CISG, a party who has either suspended performance before dispatch of
the goods in compliance with paragraph (1), or stopped the goods in transit pursuant to paragraph
(2), must immediately give notice of the suspension to the other party. Thus, even though one
party may suspend the contract without prior notification of intention to suspend, he is compelled
to inform the other party of the suspension immediately after it has taken place.77 Such notice
allows the recipient to provide the party suspending performance with adequate assurance of
performance, and thus reinstate the latter’s obligation to resume performance.
The notice is subject to art. 27 CISG and consequently need not be received by the addressee to
become effective: it is effective upon dispatch.78 In other words, the risk of transmission of the
notice is borne by the addressee. However, given that the purpose of the notice of suspension is to
allow the addressee to provide adequate assurance of performance and thus allow the parties to
communicate and cooperate in order to maintain the contract on foot, it is in the interest of the
party suspending performance to ensure that the notice of suspension is received by the addressee.
Similarly, even though the party notifying suspension of performance is under no obligation to
indicate, in the notice, the grounds for suspension, ” it may be inferred from the principle of good
faith that grounds should be stated so as to enable the other party to decide what action is to be
taken.” 79
Scholarly writings have pointed out that if the aggrieved party fails to give notice of suspension, he
does not lose the right to suspend performance, but he may have to satisfy the claims for damages
by the other party.80 On the other hand, courts uniformly conclude that in the absence of due
notice, the aggrieved party may not only have to satisfy the other party’s claims for damages, but
moreover may no longer rely on his right to suspend performance.81 Furthermore, ” if the party
suspending performance neglects to send notice, the other party may have the right to...avoid the
contract if he can show that, had he been promptly notified, he would have produced adequate
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assurance. The suspension is no longer justified, from the moment the assurance would have
barred the right to suspend performance, and, from that moment, constitutes a breach of
contract.” 82
b. Adequate Assurance of Performance
Pursuant to art. 71(3) CISG, a party who has suspended performance ” must continue with
performance if the other party provides adequate assurance of his performance.”  In this respect,
” even though there is no express requirement under the CISG, the suspending party should
inform the other party that he considers the offered assurance adequate and will continue with
performance.” 83 For the assurance provided to be adequate, it must show either that the
circumstances that led to the suspension never existed, that these circumstances have been
overcome (” give reasonable security to the first party …  that the other party will perform” 84), or
that ” the first party will be compensated for all his losses from going forward with his own
performance.” 85 In the second alternative (adequate assurance that the circumstances that led to
the suspension have been overcome), the party required to give adequate assurance of
performance must provide evidence of concrete facts or action removing the threat that he ” will
not perform a substantial part of his obligations.” 86 Merely reassuring the party who suspended
performance that the obligation will be performed or reiterating the existence of the obligation is
insufficient.87 Clearly, offering immediate performance or performing without delay satisfies the
condition set out by art. 71(3) CISG. But a vast range of other steps may be undertaken to provide
adequate assurance of performance. For example, the buyer may bring the proof that he has
reestablished current payments in cases where the threat of non-payment had emanated from the
fact that the buyer had suspended payment of his current obligations.88 The buyer may also
require the issuance by a bank of an irrevocable letter of credit in favor of the seller.89 He may
offer a guarantee by a reputable bank or other such party that the latter would pay if the buyer
failed to do so, or even offer a security interest in sufficient goods owned by the buyer to assure the
seller of reimbursement.90 Similarly, for example, in cases of threats to continued performance by
the seller resulting from a strike or the loss of a source of necessary materials, the seller may show
that the strike has been settled or that a new source of materials has been obtained for the
manufacture of the goods.91 Also, ” if export of the goods sold was prohibited, but the seller later
obtained an export license, the requirement of adequate assurance would be fulfilled.” 92 Finally,
if performance was suspended by a party because the other party had declared that he would not
perform his contractual obligations, a new statement of the latter, indicating that he intends and
is able to perform, will be considered adequate assurance of performance.93 In all cases,
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” developing an adequate solution to such problems calls for good faith consultation between the
parties.” 94
Given the fact that suspension of performance by one party is authorized, under art. 71(1) CISG,
only if there is a threat of non-performance of ” a substantial part”  of the other party’s obligations,
the former might be under the obligation to restore performance, even if the assurance of
performance provided in compliance with art. 71(3) CISG shows that performance might not be
complete nor perfect. Indeed, the assurance provided is to be considered adequate, in the sense of
art. 71(3) CISG, even if it indicates that the performance will not be in absolute conformity with
the contractual terms, provided that the non-conformity is insubstantial.95 Thus, for example,
adequate assurance is considered to have been provided even if it shows that the performance will
be slightly delayed. In such a case, however, the aggrieved party remains entitled to claim damages
on the basis of art. 74 CISG.96
The Convention does not address the question whether, after adequate assurance of performance
has been provided, the party who previously suspended performance is compelled to resume
performance of his obligations within the initial time-frame specified in the contract. Nevertheless,
there seems to be a consensus, among legal scholars, that the answer to this question is negative.
Schlechtriem holds that the time for delivery may be prolonged: ” if the buyer unexpectedly offers
payment or adequate assurances of performance according to article 71(3), the seller who cannot
meet the initial delivery date because of his justified suspension is not in fault. He is therefore not
liable for the late performance to the extent the delay corresponds to the suspension of
preparations.” 97 Similarly, in Bennett’s opinion, ” there seems to be a clear implication that the
seller is entitled to a reasonable adjustment of the date of supply to take account of the
suspension.” 98 Honnold, in turn, maintains that ” it seems that, at least in some circumstances, the
right to ‘suspend’ performance must carry with it an extension of the time for continued
performance …  The problem calls for a reasonable adjustment to the new situation.” 99 Thus, for
example, the suspending party may extend the period for performance by the time that has passed
since he has interrupted his preparatory work.100
If the request for adequate assurance of performance is justified and the non-performing party fails
to provide assurance of performance or if the assurance provided is inadequate, the innocent party
may continue to suspend performance of the contract or of obligations that ought to be fulfilled
in preparation of performance of the contract, such as, for example, the production of a good.101
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Furthermore, given that a party who failed to respond with assurances of performance has thus
made it clear that he will not perform (see infra II.6.), if the nature of the non-performance is such
as to constitute a fundamental breach of contract, the innocent party may avoid the contract for
anticipatory fundamental breach of contract, in compliance with the requirements of art. 72 CISG
(see infra III.). It is however important to stress that, as explained hereafter in detail (infra II.6.),
this is true only if the suspected breach is, in itself, fundamental in the sense of art. 25 CISG.102
Indeed, ” a failure to provide an adequate assurance does not automatically provide a right of
avoidance and there is therefore no mechanism by which a party may demand an assurance of performance
and treat a failure to respond with an adequate assurance as a fundamental breach” 103 (emphasis added).
In other words, in all cases in which the suspected breach is not fundamental, the contract
survives the threat of non-performance and the absence of adequate assurance of performance.
Consequently, if the suspected breach is not fundamental, it is only if the defaulting party does
not perform at the time agreed upon by the parties (or fixed by the Convention) for performance,
and if such non-performance constitutes a fundamental breach of contract, that the aggrieved
party may declare the contract avoided (arts. 25, 49, 64, and 81 CISG). In any case, whether the
contract be or be not declared avoided, if the failure to provide adequate assurance of
performance causes the party suspending performance to suffer damages, these may, as stated
above, be recovered, on the basis of art 74 CISG.104
If the party requested to provide adequate assurance of performance brings evidence that the
alleged grounds for suspension in fact never existed or that suspension was not justified, the
suspending party may be held liable for having breached the contract by suspending performance
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of his obligations in the absence of legitimate grounds. More particularly, depending on the
obligation suspended, ” if the first party. . . refuses to perform his obligations unfoundedly, he [may
commit] a fundamental breach of contract.” 105 The other party is consequently entitled to claim all
the remedies made available by the Convention in cases of breach of contract. He may for example
claim damages, ” not only …  because of the delay but also because of the costs incurred in
providing additional assurances.” 106
Various events can put an end to a party’s right, under art. 71 CISG, to suspend his obligation to
perform. Indeed, the obligation to perform may remain suspended only until the other party
performs his obligations, until this party provides adequate assurance of performance of his
obligations, until the first party declares the contract avoided (if the conditions of arts. 72, 49 or
64 CISG are met, see infra III.),107 or until the period of limitation applicable to the contract has
expired.108
5. Impact of the CISG on Subsequent Uniform Sets of Principles
Art. 7.3.4 UNIDROIT Principles provides that ” a party who reasonably believes that there will be
a fundamental non-performance by the other party may demand adequate assurance of due
performance and may meanwhile withhold [his] own performance. Where this assurance is not
provided within a reasonable time the party demanding it may terminate the contract.”  Similarly,
art. 8:105(1) PECL states that ” a party who reasonably believes that there will be a fundamental
non-performance by the other party may demand adequate assurance of due performance and
meanwhile may withhold performance of [his] own obligations so long as such reasonable belief
continues.”  Although these two provisions provide, just like art. 71 CISG, for mechanisms of
suspension of the creditor’s obligations, their conditions of application differ from those of art. 71
CISG.
Indeed, whereas under art. 71(1) CISG, a sufficient condition, for the creditor to be entitled to
suspend his obligations, is that it be ” apparent that the other party will not perform a substantial
part of [his] obligation,”  under art. 7.3.4 UNIDROIT Principles and art. 8:105(1) PECL, it is
necessary that the creditor reasonably believe that there will be a fundamental non-performance
for termination to be triggered. The wording of the latter provisions consequently reveals that the
drafters of the two sets of principles considered that the party who fears that a breach will be
committed may stop performing his own obligations and thus take action to protect his interests
only if the suspected breach is of fundamental nature, that is only if the suspected breach would
be such as to deprive the aggrieved party of his interest in the contract. In other words, under the
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UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL, unless the suspected breach is fundamental, a party may
not, prior to the time when the breach actually occurs, back out of his obligations, even if it is
clear that a breach will be committed.
In conclusion, rather than being compared to art. 71(1) CISG, art. 7.3.4 UNIDROIT Principles
and art. 8:105 PECL should be examined together with art. 72(2) CISG, according to which ” if
time allows, the party intending to declare the contract avoided must give reasonable notice to the
other party in order to permit him to provide adequate assurance of his performance”  (see infra
III.3.).
6. Hierarchy and Interplay Between the Right to Suspend Performance and the Right to
Avoid the Contract
Art. 71 and art. 72 CISG do not only clearly differ in their wording and in the remedies they
provide; they also seem to differ in their conditions of application. Whereas art. 71 CISG requires
the future breach to be a non-performance of a ” substantial part”  of the debtor’s obligation, art. 72
CISG requires the future breach to be ” fundamental”  in the sense of art. 25. Also, whereas art. 71
CISG purports to be applicable only if it ” becomes apparent”  that the breach will be committed,
art. 72 CISG purports to be applicable only if it is ” clear”  that the breach will be committed. These
distinctions in terminology convey substantive differences between the two provisions.
First, regarding the nature or gravity of the suspected breach, ” the drafters would not have used
two different phrases (‘fundamental breach’ as opposed to non-performance of ‘a substantial part
of his obligations’), and, in particular, two different adjectives describing the seriousness of the
breach (‘fundamental’ as opposed to ‘substantial’), had they not intended to distinguish the
seriousness of the threatened breach that would meet the standards of the respective articles.” 109
In other words, the breach needs to be more ” serious”  to trigger the more drastic remedy of
avoidance of the contract (art. 72 CISG) rather than mere suspension of performance (art. 71
CISG). Logically, this statement means that if the more onerous conditions of art. 72 CISG are
satisfied, then so are those of art. 71 CISG. In other words, it seems that when it is clear that a
fundamental breach of contract will be committed, the aggrieved party is entitled to choose
between suspending performance of his obligations and avoiding the contract. Some authors thus
hold that ” if the expected non-performance were at the same time a fundamental breach of
contract, the obligor would have a choice between suspension of performance under article 71, or
avoidance of the contract under article 72.” 110 Indeed, according to these authors, ” if an
anticipatory breach occurs, the innocent party may want to enforce specific performance in which
case [he] would make use of [his] right to suspend performance under article 71 rather than to
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avoid the contract under article 72 even if [he] is entitled to do so.” 111 It seems, however, that it is
only in theory that the innocent party benefits from such a choice. As explained in the following
paragraphs, such a solution could be unreasonable in that it could lead to unfair results, and
consequently be prohibited (indirectly) by art. 77 CISG (mitigation of losses) and the general
principle of reasonableness.
First, if the conditions of art. 72 CISG are met, the innocent party, who envisages the suspension
of the performance of his obligations under art. 71 CISG until the time for performance by the
other party has expired, should take art. 77 CISG into consideration, and conclude that the
” contract should definitely be avoided where an immediate avoidance would mitigate the
losses.” 112
Second, suspending performance rather than avoiding the contract could violate the principle of
reasonableness, which is ” a general principle of the CISG.” 113 Given the fact that the CISG does
not define this concept, Kritzer maintains that the PECL’s definition, ” which fits the manner in
which this concept is used in the CISG,” 114 ought to be taken into consideration. Pursuant to art.
1:302 PECL, ” reasonableness is to be judged by what persons acting in good faith and in the same
situation as the parties would consider to be reasonable. In particular, in assessing what is
reasonable the nature and purpose of the contract, the circumstances of the case, and the usages
and practices of the trades or professions involved should be taken into account.” 115 Coming close
to the definition of reasonableness under art. 1:302 PECL, Honnold states that under the CISG,
” what is ‘reasonable’ can appropriately be determined by ascertaining what is normal and
acceptable in the relevant trade.” 116 Van der Velden, in turn, interprets the concept of
reasonableness as entailing, among other things, an ethical standard of behavior leading one to be
judicious and fair.117
In the light of this definition of the concept of reasonableness, even though there is no doubt that
if the conditions of art. 72 CISG are satisfied, those of art. 71 CISG are a fortiori met, the innocent
party’s choice to suspend performance of his obligations rather than avoid the contract could be
inadmissible. Indeed, in cases where the non-performing party is not at fault (the suspected non-
performance does not dependent on his conduct and will), given that suspension of performance
by the other party does not free the non-performing party from his obligation to comply with the
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terms of the contract, merely suspending rather than avoiding the contract could lead to unfairly
detrimental consequences for the non-performing party and could, in that sense, be
” unreasonable.”  For example, this is the case if a party suspends performance until the date fixed
by the contract for performance and a fundamental breach occurs at that time, allowing the party
who had suspended performance to seek specific performance by the other party (art. 46 and 62
CISG). This is unfairly detrimental to the latter party, who was not at fault at the outset, and who
would have been freed from all his obligations, had the contract been initially avoided in
compliance with art. 72 CISG. In such a situation, suspension of performance by the aggrieved
party should therefore be considered contrary to general considerations of reasonableness.
The same reasoning is applicable if both the conditions of art. 71 CISG and those of art. 73 CISG
are satisfied. Indeed, ” the right to suspend under article 71 applies both to contracts of sale for a
single performance and to installment contracts governed by article 73. When the preconditions
of both articles are satisfied, the aggrieved party may choose between suspending performance and
avoiding the contract with respect to future installments under article 73(2),” 118 provided that
opting for suspension of performance is not more detrimental to the defaulting party than
avoiding the contract with respect to the said future installments.
Now, if both art. 71 and art. 72 CISG are available because, on the one hand, the conditions of
art. 72 CISG are satisfied, and, on the other hand, the innocent party is, in the light of the above
considerations regarding reasonableness, entitled to choose either remedy, this party will often
start by suspending performance of his own obligations. In this manner, first, the innocent party
is able to protect himself without delay (art. 71 CISG does not require that notice of suspension
be given prior to the moment when suspension actually takes place, whereas art. 72 CISG requires
that the innocent party give the other party reasonable notice of his intent to declare the contract
avoided). Second, by merely suspending performance of his obligations, the innocent party gives
the other party a last chance to perform in compliance with the terms of the contract before
putting an end to it. Consequently, ” if there is any doubt on whether, due to the conduct of the
other party or the prevailing circumstances, there is an anticipatory breach objectively speaking, a
party should rather exercise the right to suspend performance under article 71 CISG and require
an adequate assurance from the other party than issue a notice of avoidance under article
72(2).” 119 ” It is a safer option because the giving of a notice of avoidance in terms of art. 72(2)
under circumstances where it is not warranted may in itself constitute an anticipatory breach
entitling the other party to avoid the contract.” 120 Hence, it is often only after one party has
suspended performance of his obligations and only if the other party fails to provide adequate
assurance of performance, that the former will avoid the contract. Notice of suspension given by
the innocent party should therefore, in cases in which both art. 71 and art. 72 CISG are available,
preferably comply with the requirements of both provisions:121 such notice should indicate that
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the party giving the notice has suspended performance of his obligations and that he intends to
avoid the contract in case of failure, by the other party, to provide adequate assurance of
performance. If the party who received the notice provides adequate assurance of performance,
the other party is compelled to resume performance and is prohibited from declaring the contract
avoided.
The second issue relates to the question whether the degree of certainty required under
art. 71 CISG that a breach of contract will occur, is lower than that required under art. 72 CISG.
This issue has been profusely debated. The wording used in the two provisions is not the same:
art. 71 CISG requires that ” it [become] apparent”  that the debtor will not perform a substantial
part of his obligations, whereas art. 72 CISG requires that it be ” clear that one of the parties will
commit a fundamental breach.”  Nevertheless, some authors maintain that both provisions require
the same degree of certainty, i.e., in both cases, the innocent party must have attained a degree of
virtual or quasi certainty that a breach will occur. Schlechtriem, for example, maintains that ” the
different formulations do not require different degrees of certainty –  such a requirement would
hardly be practicable anyway. . . The decisive factor in all three provisions –  arts. 71, 72(1) and
73(2) –  is whether a reasonable person would be convinced that a breach of contract is certain to
occur.” 122 On the other hand, the majority of authors who have examined the question have come
to the conclusion that ” standards for suspension are less rigorous than the standards for avoidance
under article 72.” 123 The difference in terminology was, according to these authors, consciously
drafted124 and is also found in the French and Spanish versions of the CISG.125 Some court
decisions also seem to hold the view that art. 72 CISG requires a higher standard of prospective
certainty than art. 71 CISG.126 ” This approach is also supported by the provisions of articles 7.3.3
and 7.3.4 of the UNIDROIT Principles, where there is a clearly formulated difference in the
requirements. In terms of article 7.3.3, it is required that it be clear that there will be a
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fundamental non-performance, whereas in terms of article 7.3.4 there need only be a reasonable
belief on the part of the innocent party that there will be a fundamental non-performance.” 127 At
the time of the drafting of the CISG, such difference was ” accepted and justified on the grounds
that the remedy in article 71(1) differs in seriousness from the remedy in article 72(1). Under
article 71(1), the suspension applies only to obligations still to be performed and leaves the
contract intact, whereas, under article 72(1), an avoidance of the contract is possible.” 128 Indeed,
art. 71 CISG allows one party to suspend performance not only if the threat of non-performance
by the other party concerns the obligation to pay the price, to accept delivery of the goods, or to
deliver the goods, but also if the non-performance relates to acts to be performed in a view to
paying the price, accepting the delivery, or delivering the goods. Art. 71 CISG is used as a tool
available to the innocent party to put pressure on the other party by momentarily –  until adequate
assurance of performance is provided –  suspending performance of his obligations. Under art. 72
CISG, the innocent party’s aim is not to compel the other party to comply with his obligations;
the goal is not, like under art. 71 CISG, to ” save”  the contract, but rather to put an end to it.
The third issue concerns the consequences of the failure to provide adequate assurance of
performance, given that art. 71 CISG does not specify them. As stated above (supra II.4.), opinions
vary as to what these consequences are and therefore as to the interplay between art. 71 and art.
72 CISG. Is a failure or a refusal to provide adequate assurance of performance in itself a
fundamental breach authorizing avoidance under art. 72 CISG, or does such failure only make it
clear that the breach suspected under art. 71 CISG will be committed? If one party fails to provide
adequate assurance of performance, is the other party only entitled to continue suspending
performance of his obligations, or does he have an additional right to consider the contract
repudiated by the other party?
Many authors maintain that in case of failure to provide assurance of performance in compliance
with art. 71(3) CISG, the innocent party is entitled to invoke art. 72 CISG on anticipatory
repudiation and thus declare the contract avoided.129 The author of the present paper agrees with
the opinion of other authors, who hold that ” a failure to provide an adequate assurance does not
automatically provide a right of avoidance and there is therefore no mechanism by which a party
may demand an assurance of performance and treat a failure to respond with an adequate
assurance as a fundamental breach.” 130 Thus, the statement according to which ” under art. 71 the
party seeking assurance of performance is only entitled to suspend his own performance pending
the provision of the sought assurance [, and] it is only if adequate assurance is not furnished that
he is entitled to avoid the contract” 131 is accurate only if the suspected breach is of fundamental
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nature. If the non-performing party fails to provide assurance of performance and the suspected
breach is not of fundamental nature, the innocent party is only entitled to continue to suspend
performance of the contract or of obligations that ought to be fulfilled in preparation of
performance of the contract (supra II.4.; see however footnote 101).
This view is supported by a comparative analysis of the CISG and the relevant provisions of the
UNIDROIT Principles. Under art. 7.3.4 UNIDROIT Principles, if the innocent party reasonably
suspects –  but is not necessarily certain –  that the other party will commit a fundamental non-
performance, the former may demand adequate assurance of performance from the latter. In case
of failure by the latter to provide such assurance of performance within a reasonable period of
time, the innocent party is entitled to terminate the contract. A close connection is thus
established, in the UNIDROIT Principles, between one party’s failure to provide adequate
assurance of performance in cases in which it is not ” clear”  that a breach will be committed, and
the other party’s corresponding right to avoid the contract. This mechanism however clearly
departs from the hierarchy established between art. 71 and art. 72 CISG. First, art. 71 CISG,
which –  like art. 7.3.4 UNIDROIT Principles –  authorizes suspension of performance in cases it
which it is not ” clear”  but merely ” apparent”  that a breach will be committed, does not mention
any right of one party to declare the contract avoided in case of failure by the other party to
provide assurance of performance. Second and most importantly, in case of failure by one party to
provide adequate assurance of performance, art. 7.3.4 UNIDROIT Principles authorizes the other
party to avoid the contract only if the suspected non-performance is of fundamental nature.
Consequently, even though the failure to provide, under art. 71 CISG, adequate assurance may –
just like under art. 7.3.4 UNIDROIT Principles –  make it ” clear,”  in the sense of art. 72 CISG,
that a breach will be committed, such a failure does not in itself constitute a fundamental breach,
nor does it transform the suspected mere breach into a fundamental breach. In conclusion, under
the CISG, if the breach initially suspected is not fundamental, avoidance of the contract is
prohibited, even in cases of failure to provide adequate assurance of performance.
III. AVOIDANCE PRIOR TO THE DATE FOR PERFORMANCE
1. Purpose and Rationale of the Provision
One of the fundamental purposes of the Convention is to maintain international commercial
contracts intact and to allow their performance even in adverse circumstances, in order to
promote loyalty and good faith in international commercial transactions. Therefore, the
Convention was drafted so as to permit avoidance of international sales contracts only in cases in
which, clearly, continuation would cause one party or both parties irreparable harm. In other
words, arts. 49 and 64 CISG authorize the buyer and the seller respectively to avoid the contract
only if the other party has committed a fundamental breach of contract in the sense of art. 25
CISG. In sum, avoidance of the contract under the CISG is clearly a remedy of extrema ratio.
A priori, art. 72 CISG seems to contradict the spirit of the Convention. First, this provision
authorizes one party to avoid the contract when no breach has actually occurred and the time for
performance has not yet elapsed. Second, art. 72 CISG is not limited to cases of objective
impossibility of performance but is also applicable in cases of subjective inability to perform (see
infra III.2.). Consequently, even though art. 72 CISG provides that the contract may, in theory, be
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avoided only if it is objectively ” clear”  or certain that a fundamental breach will occur, the risk
remains that a contract be avoided even though the difficulties faced by one party in the
performance of his obligations would in fact have been overcome before the time agreed upon by
the parties for performance.
Art. 72 CISG is nevertheless the result of a compromise that satisfied the member states. The
drafters came to the conclusion that if, at one point in time before the time agreed upon for
performance, it is objectively ” clear”  that a fundamental breach will be committed, the interests of
the party threatened by the breach ought to be primarily protected. Indeed, the drafters
considered that art. 71 CISG (right to suspend performance, supra II.) might not grant sufficient
protection if the suspected breach is of fundamental nature, and they considered that the
protection of the threatened interests requires that the innocent party be entitled to declare the
contract avoided, for example, so as to expeditiously enter into another contract, or remove
uncertainty regarding financial commitments.132 However, with regard to the principle according
to which avoidance of contract is a remedy of last resort, the drafters complied with ” the desire
expressed by developing countries to permit the party whose breach is presumed to provide
assurances and thereby to prevent the avoidance (article 72(2)).” 133
2. Conditions of Avoidance of the Contract
Pursuant to art. 72(1) CISG, ” if prior to the date for performance of the contract it is clear that
one of the parties will commit a fundamental breach of contract, the other party may declare the
contract avoided.”  Given the fact that avoidance of contract is a remedy of extrema ratio, in
particular when based on the prospect of a breach (rather than on a breach that has actually taken
place), art. 72 CISG precisely circumscribes the two conditions that ought to be satisfied for one
party to be authorized to declare the contract avoided. The first condition relates to the degree of
certainty that a breach will be committed. The second condition concerns the nature and
magnitude of the breach.
a. Degree of Certainty That a Breach Will Occur
Art. 72(1) CISG requires, as a first condition, that the party who intends to declare the contract
avoided ensure that it is ” clear”  that the other party will commit a fundamental breach of contract.
” A mere suspicion, even a well-founded one, is not sufficient.” 134 Even though art. 72 CISG does
not explicitly identify the degree of clarity or certainty that ought to be reached, a higher degree of
clarity is required for the application of art. 72 CISG than for the application of art. 71 CISG (see
considerations above, supra II.6.). Nevertheless, scholars and courts agree that art. 72 CISG does
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not require absolute and unshakable certainty that a breach will be committed.135 In a 1992
German decision, the Landgericht (District Court) Berlin stated that, under art. 72 CISG, a very
high degree of probability is required (” eine an Sicherheit grenzende Wahrscheinlichkeit” ).136 In fact, it
transpires from the mechanisms provided for in art. 72(2) and (3) CISG that absolute certainty is
not required. Art. 72(2) CISG envisages the possibility that adequate assurance of performance be
provided and the contract be eventually performed, even if it was initially ” clear”  that a breach
would be committed. In turn, art. 72(3) CISG indicates that a party’s declaration ” that he will not
perform his obligations”  empowers the other party to declare the contract avoided even though
the declaration of the repudiating party does not make it absolutely ” clear”  that he will not change
his mind and perform by the due date.137 The mechanisms provided for in art. 72(2) and (3) CISG
also show that it is precisely at the time of the declaration of avoidance that it must be objectively
clear that a breach will be committed. In other words, the innocent party is not compelled to
ensure that, at all times until the moment fixed for performance, there will be objective certainty
that a breach will occur. Otherwise, the only situations covered by art. 72 CISG would be those in
which it has become impossible for one party to perform his obligations; art. 72(2) and (3) CISG
would never be enforced and would consequently have remained a dead letter. After all, ” an
anticipatory, fundamental breach of contract is, except when there is an express statement by the
obligor, a presumption which is based on objective factors” 138 at a particular moment in time.
In any case, the suspicion that a fundamental breach of contract will be committed must be
objectively founded. Indeed, as explained above (supra II.6.), just as the contract may not be
suspended, under art. 71 CISG, on the basis of one party’s merely subjective fear, under art. 72
CISG, a fortiori, the contract may not be avoided on the basis of such subjective fear. Rather,
objective grounds must show that it is ” clear that one of the parties will commit a fundamental
breach of contract.” 139 It is important to note here that the failure to provide, in compliance with
art. 72(3) CISG, adequate assurance of performance (see infra III.3.), makes it objectively clear that
a breach will be committed. Indeed, the Secretariat has articulated that ” the failure by a party to
give adequate assurance that he will perform when properly requested to do so under [Draft]
article 62(3) [counterpart of the current art. 71(3)] may help make it ‘clear’ that he will commit a
fundamental breach.” 140 Scholars similarly maintain that it is ” possible to conclude that the
promisor’s failure to provide adequate assurance in accordance with paragraph (2) of article 72
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makes it ‘clear’ that he will commit a fundamental breach.” 141 Thus, if one party suspects that the
other will commit a fundamental breach of contract and requests assurance of performance in
compliance with art. 71(3) CISG, the latter party’s failure to provide such assurance makes it
” clear,”  in the sense of art. 72(1) CISG, that the breach will be committed.
Under art. 72 CISG, as opposed to art. 71 CISG, ” there is no requirement that the anticipated
breach be clear as a result of any particular conduct or circumstances.” 142 Indeed, whereas art. 71
CISG specifies the circumstances that may cause one party not to perform a substantial part of his
obligations, art. 72 CISG does not list the situations that may lead to the conclusion that a
fundamental breach will be committed. Under the latter provision, ” it is sufficient that [the
breach] be clear whatever the clarity results from.” 143 In other words, the future occurrence of a
fundamental breach may be made manifest, just as under art. 71 CISG, by a serious deficiency in
the debtor’s ability to perform or in his creditworthiness, or may follow from his conduct in
preparing to perform or in performing the contract, but it may also result from other
circumstances not expressly mentioned in the text of the law.144
According to the Secretariat’s Commentary on the draft of art. 63 (counterpart of the current art.
72 CISG145), ” the future fundamental breach may be clear either because of the words or actions
of the party which constitute a repudiation of the contract or because of an objective fact, such as
the destruction of the seller’s plant by fire or the imposition of an embargo or monetary controls
which will render impossible future performance.” 146 Indeed, art. 72 ” combines in one rule the
refusal to perform and an anticipated objective impossibility to perform.” 147 In the absence of
objective circumstances making performance impossible (such as insolvency of the obligor or the
initiation of bankruptcy proceedings148), the contract may also be avoided for a number of
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” subjective reasons”  which make it clear, in the sense of art. 72 CISG, that a breach will be
committed. The Secretariat Commentary, scholarly writings, and case law have articulated the
following few examples of circumstances –  which are not objective circumstances leading to an
absolute certainty that performance has, forever, become impossible –  in which the innocent party
is entitled to consider that it is ” clear,”  in the sense of art. 72(1) CISG, that a fundamental breach
will be committed.
Firstly, the contract may be avoided by one party if, as expressly envisaged by art. 72(3) CISG, the
other party repudiates the said contract, either through his actions, or by declaring that he will not
perform his obligations or that his performance will be defective.149 For example, the seller or the
buyer is deemed to have repudiated the contract if he declares that he will not perform his
obligations, or if he denies the very existence of the sale contract.150 Also, the seller is deemed to
have repudiated the contract if he resells to a third party the goods that he had contracted to
deliver to the buyer, or if he resells either the plant where he had pledged himself to manufacture
the goods for the buyer, or the machines with which he had agreed to produce the goods for the
buyer.151 Thus, for instance, allegations, if proved, that the seller stated he would ” no longer feel
obligated”  to perform and would ” sell the material elsewhere”  entitle the buyer to avoid the
contract.152 It is important to note here that if the aggrieved party does not respond to repudiation
by declaring the contract avoided, he may be obliged to accept performance if the party who
repudiated the contract changes his mind.
Secondly, Schlechtriem maintains that ” the frequent cases in which a demand for new terms or
alleged contract violations by the other side are used as a pretext for not performing one’s own
obligations”  constitute, ” in most cases,”  a ground for immediate avoidance.153 ” This proposition
was probably intended to govern situations in which one party (A) demands new terms from the
other (B), coupled with an unconditional declaration that A ‘will not perform’ [his] obligations.
Avoidance by B should not be triggered if A informs B of the need to negotiate a modification of
their agreement (cf. art. 29). In any event, a response by B that goes beyond a notice of suspension
of B’s counter-performance and a request for assurance (art. 71) may be hazardous since it may
provide grounds for A to avoid the contract on the ground that B has repudiated under
art. 72(1).” 154
Finally, the precondition of paragraph (1), that it be ” clear”  that a fundamental breach will be
committed, has been found to be satisfied in the following circumstances: the buyer failed to pay
for prior shipments;155 the buyer failed to open a letter of credit;156 the seller failed to reduce the
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price and to commit to deliver fashion goods on time;157 the seller deliberately stopped delivering
the goods.158
b. Magnitude of the Suspected Breach
The second condition imposed by art. 72(1) CISG for the innocent party to be entitled to declare
the contract avoided is that the suspected breach be fundamental in the sense of art. 25 CISG.
This condition applies to both suspected defective performances and suspected delayed
performances, if the time for performance is of the essence of the contract or if the contract
stipulates that a delay in performance constitutes a fundamental breach of contract.
According to art. 25 CISG, ” a breach of contract committed by one of the parties is fundamental
if it results in such detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is
entitled to expect under the contract, unless the party in breach did not foresee and a reasonable
person of the same kind in the same circumstances would not have foreseen such a result.”  An
example of anticipatory fundamental breach often encountered is bankruptcy.159 The history of
art. 25 CISG indicates that the term ” so as substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to
expect under the contract”  does ” not refer to the extent of the damage, but instead to the
importance of the interests which the contract and its individual obligations actually create for the
promisee.” 160 Consequently, there is a fundamental breach of contract only if the aggrieved party,
as a result of the breach, not only loses interest in the performance of the contract, but also suffers
a detriment.161 Consequently, there is no anticipatory fundamental breach in the following
situations: the seller has held back the goods;162 the seller expressed an interest in stopping
deliveries but also agreed to continue negotiations;163 the buyer failed to pay one installment.164
c. Declaration of Avoidance
If the conditions of art. 72(1) CISG are satisfied and notice of avoidance has been given (see infra
III.3.), the innocent party may declare the contract avoided. ” There is no time limit for such
declaration. If the entitled party first decides to wait, he may avoid the contract at any time before
the period for performance expires,” 165 provided that the conditions of art. 72(1) CISG are
satisfied at the time of the declaration. Given its prompt effect, a declaration of avoidance cannot
be withdrawn once it has become effective.166
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” If a party declares the contract avoided without a fundamental breach of contract by the other
party being anticipated, the former commits a fundamental breach of contract” 167 and is
compelled to accept the latter’s performance. Indeed, if, at the time performance was due, no
fundamental breach would in fact have occurred, the original expectation that a breach would be
committed may not have been ” clear,”  and the declaration of avoidance may consequently be void.
In such a case, the party who attempted to avoid would be in breach of the contract given his own
failure to perform.168 In other words, the action of the party who declared the contract avoided
” may be invalid and lead to the result that his own subsequent non-performance amounts to a
breach and possible liability for damages.” 169 Consequently, the declaration of avoidance is to be
considered as wrongful and may in turn constitute a repudiation of the contract, giving the other
party the right to avoid the contract in accordance with art. 72(1) CISG.170
3. Advance Notice of Intent to Avoid the Contract and Adequate Assurance of Performance
a. Advance Notice of Intent to Avoid the Contract
Pursuant to art. 72(2) CISG, ” if time allows, the party intending to declare the contract avoided
must give reasonable notice to the other party in order to permit him to provide adequate
assurance of his performance.”  ” The notice of the party intending to declare the contract avoided
demanding that the other party provide adequate assurance of the performance, as art. 72(2)
CISG allows in such a case, seems to be the best solution to relieve the former party from doubts
about occurrence of the other party’s breach and reduces the risk he would otherwise be
taking.” 171 Thus, the notice of the innocent party requesting adequate assurance of performance
primarily serves two purposes. First, for the party who suspects without certainty that a breach will
be committed, it does not compel him to wait until the date of performance, unable to protect his
interests, and then incur losses if the other party eventually does not perform. Second, the
obligation of giving notice in compliance with art. 72(2) CISG and the opportunity thus granted
to the non-performing party to provide adequate assurance of performance prevent hasty
declarations of avoidance in cases in which it eventually appears that the other party would have
performed his obligations in compliance with the terms of the contract. Thus, the obligation of
giving notice protects the party wishing to avoid the contract from wrongfully declaring the
contract avoided and consequently being held liable in damages.
The notice is subject to art. 27 CISG. It does not need to be received by the addressee to become
effective. Therefore, ” if it is lost, the party entitled to avoid the contract does not lose that right.
But he should in his own interest make sure that the notice reaches the other party.” 172
Art. 72(3) CISG provides a first exception to the general obligation to give notice of intent to
avoid the contract. Indeed, this paragraph states that ” the requirements of the preceding
paragraph do not apply if the other party has declared that he will not perform his obligations.”
Thus, if a party has repudiated the contract (which is, according to Schlechtriem, the most
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frequent situation), the other party may declare the contract avoided without having first given
notice of his intent to do so173 (for a more detailed analysis of the consequences of a repudiation
of the contract, see infra III.6.). Also, ” since [art. 72(3)’s] exception also covers the frequent cases
in which a demand for new terms or alleged contract violations by the other side are used as a
pretext for not performing one’s own obligations, immediate avoidance still remains an option in
most cases.” 174 Nonetheless, one should remember that declaring the contract avoided, if it has
been repudiated by the other party, is a right, not an obligation. If the aggrieved party does not
avoid the contract, and if the debtor of the obligation changes his mind, the latter may still
perform the contract.175
The obligation to give notice, under art. 72(2) CISG, suffers a second exception: the party who
intends to declare the contract avoided is under no obligation of giving reasonable notice if time
does not allow it. As a general rule, ” given the sophisticated means of communication, it is hardly
imaginable that time would not allow to give notice to the other party of the intended avoidance
of the contract.” 176 Nevertheless, two situations may be envisaged in which one ought to consider
that time does not allow the party wishing to avoid the contract to give notice of his intent. First,
the contract may be declared avoided without prior notice of intent, if such notice would result in
a delay which would be prejudicial to the interests of the innocent party. Second, sending a notice
of intent is not a condition to the declaration of avoidance if the time-span between the moment
when notice would have been given and the expiration of the time for performance would be too
short for the addressee of the notice to provide adequate assurance of performance in compliance
with art. 72(2) CISG.177 In other words, notice to the other party is unnecessary in cases where the
delivery date is so near that adequate assurance could not be provided in time. Indeed, ” the object
of the notice requirement is to enable the other party to provide adequate assurance of his
performance. If that has become impossible, then the necessity to give notice must surely fall
away.” 178 Notice must be ” reasonable,”  and it is reasonable only if the addressee has a chance to
provide assurance of performance.179 ” Where there is little chance that the other party can still
provide security –  for example, where a delivery cannot be made because of war –  notice will often
be unnecessary.” 180 Consequently, the following conclusion may be reached: notice of one party’s
intent to avoid the contract is unnecessary in all situations in which it is objectively certain that a
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fundamental breach will be committed. In any event, ” if there is doubt on whether the innocent
party should have informed or not, the court ought to rule in favor of the innocent party, i.e., that
there was no duty to inform.” 181
b. Adequate Assurance of Performance
As mentioned earlier, the object of the obligation to give notice of intent to declare the contract
avoided is ” to permit [the other party] to provide adequate assurance of his performance”  (art.
72(2) CISG). ” What constitutes an adequate assurance varies depending on the circumstances,
including the standing and integrity of the promisor, his previous conduct in relation to the
contract, and the nature of the event that creates uncertainty as to his ability and willingness to
perform.” 182 As a general rule, an assurance of performance is deemed adequate if it gives
reasonable security to the creditor of the obligation either that the debtor will perform or that the
creditor will be compensated for all losses incurred in executing his own performance. As stated
above, a reassuring statement, i.e., a mere statement of intention and ability to perform will
generally be considered insufficient.183 ” In most instances, a new term of payment against
documents, a guarantee by a reputable bank, or a letter of credit issued by a reputable bank will be
required.” 184 ” If there is serious doubt as to the seller’s performing of his obligations, he could also
provide a guarantee of performance. He could also explain in which way he can and will deliver
the goods in time, in the agreed quality and free from third party rights or claims (e.g., use of sub-
contractors, increase in the production capacity, cancellation of other obligations to deliver,
acquisition of licenses, etc.).” 185
” The absence of an assurance of performance in response to a notice under . . . paragraph [(2)]
would normally tend to make it clear that a breach is going to occur” 186 (see supra III.2.).
Consequently, in all cases in which the innocent party is under the obligation to give notice of his
intent to declare the contract avoided, the failure of the other party to provide adequate assurance
of performance is a necessary and sufficient condition for the avoidance of the contract. In other
words, with the exception of cases of repudiation of the contract and cases in which time does not
allow the party who intends to declare the contract avoided to give reasonable notice to the other
party, the former may declare the contract avoided if and only if the debtor of the obligation fails
to provide adequate assurance of performance. A parallel may therefore be established between
the obligation to provide adequate assurance of performance, with regard to anticipated non-
delivery, non-payment, or failure to take delivery, under art. 72(2) CISG, and the Nachfrist
procedure under arts. 49(1)(b) and 64(1)(b) CISG. The purpose of both mechanisms is the same,
namely to give the obligor a last chance to perform his obligation and thus ” remove the
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performance obstacles which give rise to the right to avoidance. While the ‘Nachfrist-type’
procedure eliminates uncertainty when performance is overdue, the adequate assurance procedure
eliminates uncertainty concerning performance that is not yet due.” 187 Both mechanisms aim at
maintaining the contract on foot.
4. Consequences of the Avoidance of the Contract
The declaration results in prompt avoidance of the contract; no agreement by the other party, nor
any assistance by the courts is required.188 Furthermore, ” a party which exercises a right to
terminate the contract for anticipatory non-performance has the same rights as on termination for
actual non-performance and is therefore entitled to exercise any other remedies available to actual
non-performance, including damages, except that damages are not recoverable where the non-
performance at the due date would be excused” 189 (arts. 74 to 76 CISG). Thus, the consequences
of a declaration of avoidance include, on the one hand, the right to claim restitution of whatever
the avoiding party has supplied or paid under the contract (art. 81(2) CISG), and, on the other
hand, the right to recover damages (art. 81(1) CISG).
Regarding damages, in all cases in which a party wrongfully repudiates the contract, the other
party, who declared the contract avoided, is allowed to resell or repurchase the goods that were the
object of the first contractual agreement, regardless of the fact that the party who repudiated the
contract might change his mind and eventually offer to perform his obligations within the time-
frame set by the contract. ” In addition, by virtue of article 75, a reasonably prompt resale or
repurchase (even prior to the date for performance) may fix the damages for which the repudiating
party will be liable.” 190 Furthermore, even when it is clear that a fundamental breach of contract
will occur, the duty to mitigate the loss, mentioned under art. 77 CISG, may require the party
who intends to invoke that breach to take measures to protect his interests, to reduce his loss,
including loss of profit, resulting from the breach, even prior to the contract date for
performance.191 Thus, for instance, ” if it is clear that a non-delivery of goods amounting to a
fundamental breach is going to occur and that the amount of the losses expected to result from
the breach is greater if prompt action is not taken to make alternative arrangements for the supply
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of the goods, the obligation to mitigate losses requires avoidance action under article 71 even
before the breach has occurred.” 192
In case of wrongful declaration of avoidance (i.e., if the conditions of art. 72(1) CISG were in fact
not satisfied, for instance, if it appears that in fact it was not ” clear”  that a breach would occur, or
the suspected breach was not of fundamental nature), the party who declared the contract avoided
is under the obligation to accept performance by the other party, and may be considered by the
latter as having repudiated the contract under art. 72(1).193
5. Impact of the CISG on Subsequent Uniform Sets of Principles
The wording of art. 9:304 PECL194 is almost identical to that of art. 7.3.3 UNIDROIT
Principles.195 Furthermore, the notion of anticipatory breach adopted by these two provisions is
very close to that of art. 72(1) CISG. The rationale of all three provisions is the same: a party to a
contract cannot reasonably be expected to continue to be bound by it if it has become clear that
the other party will commit a fundamental breach, cannot or will not perform at the due date.196
Furthermore, in all three sets of rules and principles, ” any fundamental non-performance is
regarded as a breach of contract, whether the performance was possible or not. Thus where
substantial performance becomes impossible, even if such impossibility results from circumstances
beyond the control of the obligor, non-performance or mal-performance is still regarded as a
breach.” 197 As a consequence, all three provisions ” are said to establish the principle that a non-
performance which is to be expected is to be equated with a non-performance which occurred at
the time when performance fell due.” 198
Art. 7.3.3 UNIDROIT Principles and art. 9:304 PECL are largely inspired by art. 72 CISG, not
only with respect to the notion of anticipatory breach on which they are founded, but also with
respect to the conditions of avoidance that each provision lays out. In all three cases, ” anticipatory
non-performance”  means ” an obvious unwillingness or inability to perform where the failure in
performance would be fundamental within art. 8:103” 199 PECL. Furthermore, under the
UNIDROIT Principles, the PECL, and the CISG, the party faced with an anticipatory non-
performance may terminate the contract at any time, provided that two conditions are satisfied.
First, the inability or unwillingness to perform must be manifest; a mere suspicion, even well-
founded, is insufficient.200 Under the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL, however, mere
doubts as to the ability or willingness to perform allow the creditor of the performance to demand
assurance of performance under art. 7.3.4, respectively art 8:105; meanwhile, he may withhold
Nordic Journal of Commercial Law issue 2005 #2
201 Commission on European Contract Law, supra note 134, at 417; Chengwei, supra note 11, § 9.6.2.
202 For examples of situations in which it is clear that a fundamental breach will be committed, see supra III.2.
203 Eiselen, Remarks on the Manner in which the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts May be
Used to Interpret or Supplement Articles 71 and 72 of the CISG and Remarks on the Manner in which the Principles of
European Contract Law May Be Used to Interpret or Supplement Articles 71 and 72 of the CISG, supra note 111.
204 Eiselen, Remarks on the Manner in which the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts May be
Used to Interpret or Supplement Articles 71 and 72 of the CISG and Remarks on the Manner in which the Principles of
European Contract Law May Be Used to Interpret or Supplement Articles 71 and 72 of the CISG, supra note 111.
34
performance of his own obligations201 (see infra for a more detailed analysis of this specificity of the
UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL). Second, the threatened non-performance must be
fundamental in the sense of art. 25 CISG, respectively art. 7.3.1 UNIDROIT Principles and 8:103
PECL.
The provisions of the CISG regarding anticipatory avoidance of the contract however differ, in
various respects, from those of the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL. First, the scope of
application of art. 72(1) CISG seems to be narrower than that of art. 7.3.3 UNIDROIT Principles
and of art. 9:304 PECL. Indeed, some authors maintain that whereas art. 72(1) CISG requires
that the debtor of the obligation be the author (” will commit” ) of the fundamental breach, the
conditions of art. 9:304 PECL and art. 7.3.3 UNIDROIT Principles are satisfied if it is clear202
that ” there will be”  a fundamental non-performance, regardless of the identity of the author of the
non-performance. Nevertheless, this distinction does not hold an important place beyond the
boundaries of a theoretical comparative analysis.203
Second, the interplay between provisions governing suspension of performance and provisions
governing avoidance of the contract differs between the CISG, on the one hand, and the
UNIDROIT Principles and PECL, on the other hand. As explained above (supra II.5.), even
though the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL grant to the innocent party, as does art. 71(1)
CISG, a right to suspend performance of his obligations, in the context of the two sets of non-
binding principles, such right may only be exercised if the suspected breach is of fundamental
nature. Consequently, the innocent party benefits from no remedy (similar to that provided by art.
71 CISG) if the suspected breach is not of fundamental nature. Furthermore, the difference,
between cases of suspension of performance and cases of avoidance of the contract, in the
required degree of certainty that a breach will occur, seems to be clearer in the UNIDROIT
Principles and in the PECL than in the CISG. Whereas art. 7.3.3 UNIDROIT Principles and
art. 9:304 PECL, pertaining to the avoidance of the contract, require that it be objectively clear
that a fundamental non-performance will occur, art. 7.3.4 UNIDROIT Principles and
art. 8:105 PECL, pertaining to the suspension of performance, only require that there be a
subjective reasonable belief, on the part of the innocent party, that there will be a fundamental
non-performance.204 As to the provisions of the CISG, both art. 71 and art. 72 CISG require that
the future occurrence of the breach be objectively recognizable, but the degree of certainty that a
breach will occur, is higher under art. 72 CISG than under art. 71 CISG. The drafters of the two
sets of non-binding Principles have thus avoided an on-going debate similar to the one opposing
the two formulations ” it is clear,”  under art. 72 CISG, and ” it becomes apparent,”  under art. 71(1)
CISG, that a breach will be committed.
Third, the CISG’s approach to avoidance of the contract is more lenient than that of the
UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL. Indeed, under art. 72(2) and (3) CISG, the innocent party
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is under the obligation, when time allows it, to give to the other party notice of his intent to
declare the contract avoided, unless the other party has clearly announced his intention not to
perform his obligations. As already mentioned, the object of the notification is to grant the
addressee a last chance to provide adequate assurance of performance and thus prevent a
declaration of avoidance. Under art. 7.3.3 UNIDROIT Principles and art. 9:304 PECL, there is
no such obligation.205 Indeed, ” a party is not obligated to inform the other party, but may as a
precaution require an adequate assurance of due performance, failing which that party is entitled
to terminate the agreement” 206 (art. 7.3.4 UNIDROIT Principles and art. 8:105 PECL).
Fourth, the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL establish a close connection between
suspension of performance and avoidance of the contract, which is absent from the CISG.
According to art. 7.3.4 UNIDROIT Principles and art. 8:105 PECL, a party who reasonably
believes that there will be a fundamental non-performance by the other party may demand
adequate assurance of performance and meanwhile may withhold performance of his own
obligations; if the requested assurance is not provided within a reasonable time, the party who
demanded it may terminate the contract. There is thus a ” close connection between the provisions
of article 7.3.3 and 7.3.4” 207 UNIDROIT Principles, as well as ” between the provisions of article
9:304 and 8:105” 208 PECL. If a party is uncertain as to whether there will be a fundamental
breach, but reasonably suspects that it may occur, that party is, according to art. 7.3.4 UNIDROIT
Principles and art. 8:105 PECL, entitled to demand an adequate assurance of performance from
the other party. Failure to provide such assurance is a sufficient ground, under art. 7.3.4
UNIDROIT Principles and art. 8:105 PECL, to terminate the contract.209 ” In other words, if the
aggrieved party does not receive adequate assurance of performance and still believes on
reasonable grounds that performance will not be forthcoming, it may terminate the contract …
The other party’s failure to give the assurance requested is itself treated as a fundamental non-
performance under the two sets of Principles, giving the aggrieved party the right to terminate the
contract and also a right to damages where the deemed non-performance is not excused.” 210 More
precisely, the failure to provide adequate assurance of performance turns a reasonable subjective
belief that a breach could occur into an objective certainty or clarity (required under art. 7.3.3
UNIDROIT Principles and art. 9:304 PECL for avoidance of the contract), which authorizes the
innocent party to declare the contract avoided. Such a close connection between suspension of
performance and avoidance of the contract is absent from the CISG for the following reason.
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Whereas the provisions of the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL governing suspension and
avoidance of the contract both apply only if the (objectively or subjectively) suspected breach is
fundamental, under the CISG, only art. 72 CISG, governing avoidance of the contract, requires
that the suspected breach be of fundamental nature. For the innocent party to be entitled to
suspend the contract, in compliance with art. 71 CISG, it is sufficient that it be apparent that a
breach of a substantial part of the debtor’s obligations will be committed. Thus, the suspected
breach, under art. 71 CISG, is generally not of fundamental nature and, as explained above (supra
II. 4. and 6.), the failure to provide adequate assurance of performance in compliance with art.
71(3) CISG does not, in itself, constitute a fundamental breach.211 Such failure only makes it clear
that a breach will be committed but does not modify the nature of that breach. It is therefore
logical that art. 71 CISG does not provide a right, for the innocent party, to avoid the contract if
the other party has failed to provide adequate assurance of performance. Under the UNIDROIT
Principles and the PECL, even if it is initially not objectively ” clear”  that a breach will be
committed, given that the suspected breach is fundamental, the drafters have agreed that failure
to provide adequate assurance of performance should authorize the innocent party to declare the
contract avoided.
In conclusion, it appears that even though the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL seem to have
installed a more strict standard than the CISG in that they do not grant the innocent party any
remedy if the suspected breach is not fundamental, it is easier for the innocent party, under these
Principles than under the CISG, to declare the contract avoided. Also, if it is ” clear,”  under the
UNIDROIT Principles or the PECL, that a fundamental non-performance will occur, ” there is no
requirement to give notice as is the case with article 72 of the CISG.” 212 Hence, the structure of
the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL allow the innocent party to enter rapidly into another
contractual relationship and thus preserve his commercial interests.
Regarding the effects of contract termination, the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL share
some common rules with the CISG. Like art. 81(1) ab initio CISG, art. 7.3.5(1) UNIDROIT
Principles and art. 9:305(1) PECL provide that both parties are released from their obligation to
execute future performances and lose the right to claim future performances. Thus, in all three
systems, in case of avoidance of the contract, ” both parties are released from their obligations to
carry out the contract: the seller need not deliver the goods and the buyer need not take delivery
or pay for them.” 213 Furthermore, art. 9:305(2) PECL and art. 7.3.5(3) UNIDROIT Principles
stipulate, like art. 81(1) in fine CISG, that ” avoidance does not affect any provision of the contract
for the settlement of disputes or any other provision of the contract governing the rights and
obligations of the parties consequent upon the avoidance of the contract” , such as, for example,
the right to seek damages for breach of contract (expressly mentioned under art. 7.3.5(2)
UNIDROIT Principles). Indeed, ” an avoidance only <redirects’ the main obligations of the
contract; it does not void the contract ab initio. Under article 81 CISG, damage claims for breach,
dispute-settlement mechanisms (arbitration clauses), liquidated damages and penalty clauses, etc.
are not affected by avoidance (article 81 sentence two).” 214
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There is, however, an important difference, regarding the effects of contract termination, between
the PECL, on the one hand, and the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles, on the other hand.
Under the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles, restitution subsequent to termination is the
rule, whereas under the PECL, it is the exception. ” While the CISG [and the UNIDROIT
Principles tend] to eliminate the consequences of an already partially performed contract, the
PECL tends to maintain the exchange when it is satisfactory for both parties.” 215 Art. 81(2) CISG
stipulates that ” a party who has performed the contract either wholly or in part may claim
restitution from the other party of whatever the first party has supplied or paid under the contract.
If both parties are bound to make restitution, they must do so concurrently.” 216 Art. 7.3.6(1)
UNIDROIT Principles provides the same general principles, however moderated by paragraph (2)
of the same provision: ” on termination of the contract either party may claim restitution of
whatever [he] has supplied, provided that such party concurrently makes restitution of whatever
[he] has received. If restitution in kind is not possible or appropriate allowance should be made in
money whenever reasonable. However, if performance of the contract has extended over a period
of time and the contract is divisible, such restitution can only be claimed for the period after
termination has taken effect.”  In other words, as a general rule, all that has been exchanged in
compliance with the contract must be restituted after termination: each party can claim restitution
of whatever he has paid or supplied under the contract, and if both parties have to make
restitution, restitution must be made concurrently.217 On the contrary, under the PECL, a
restitution duty exists only when ” one party has conferred a benefit on the other party without
receiving the promised counter-performance in exchange.” 218 Indeed, the termination of a contract
in compliance with the provisions of the PECL does not undo what has taken place before
termination: the performances received must neither be returned, nor must restitution of their
value be made. It stems from arts. 9:305, 9:307, and 9:308 PECL, that restitution subsequent to
termination is appropriate only in certain circumstances, namely when the property transferred
has become useless, as a consequence of the termination, for the party who received it (art. 9:306
PECL), and when a party, by performing his contractual obligation, has conferred a benefit upon
his co-contracting party, but has not received the corresponding counter-performance (arts. 9:307
and 9:308 PECL).
The rules of the CISG, on the one hand, and those of the PECL and the UNIDROIT Principles,
on the other hand, also differ with respect to the effects of the impossibility, for a party, to
restitute the goods received in substantially the same condition as when they were delivered.
Under the CISG, if a party is unable to restitute the goods in substantially the same condition as
when he received them, he is prohibited from avoiding the contract. Indeed, according to art.
82(1) CISG, ” the buyer loses the right to declare the contract avoided [… ] if it is impossible for
him to make restitution of the goods substantially in the condition in which he received them.”  In
other words, ” the ability to return the goods received in substantially the condition in which one
received them is <a prerequisite for avoiding the contract [… ].’” 219 Nevertheless, art. 82(2) CISG,
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which deals with the issue of allocation of risk of loss of the goods before avoidance of the
contract, provides three exceptions to the general rule stated under art. 82(1) CISG. The buyer is
entitled to declare the contract avoided, even if he cannot make restitution of the goods in
compliance with art. 82(1) CISG, if (a) the damages to the goods are not due to the buyer’s act or
omission; (b) the deterioration or consumption of the goods results from the examination as
required by art. 38 CISG; or (c) the goods are sold in the normal course of business or consumed
or transformed by him in the normal course of use before he discovered, or should have
discovered, their lack of conformity. Under art. 9:309 PECL, a party may, after termination of the
contract, recover a reasonable amount for the value of the performance rendered to the other
party, if the former has rendered a performance and has not received payment or counter-
performance for it, and if that performance cannot be refunded by the other party. Similarly, art.
7.3.6(1) UNIDROIT Principles provides that ” if restitution in kind is not possible or appropriate
allowance should be made in money whenever reasonable.”  Restitution in kind is, for example,
not appropriate when the aggrieved party has received part of the performance and wants to retain
that part.220 ” The purpose of specifying that allowance should be made in money ‘whenever
reasonable’ is to make it clear that allowance should only be made if, and to the extent that, the
performance received has conferred a benefit on the party claiming restitution.” 221 In conclusion,
with the exception of the three specific cases mentioned above, the CISG, which addresses, in art.
82 CISG, the issue of termination, does not allow the avoidance of the contract if the goods
cannot be restituted. On the contrary, under the PECL and the UNIDROIT Principles,
restitution is not a prerequisite to termination (art. 9:309 PECL and 7.3.6 UNIDROIT
Principles).
” Neither the Convention, nor the PECL [, nor the UNIDROIT Principles] have any specific
provisions dealing with: (i) the expenses incurred in making restitution; (ii) the rights acquired by
third parties; (iii) the location where the restitution must be made and (iv) the buyer's
responsibility when the goods that must be returned are destroyed after the effective date of a
declaration of avoidance.” 222
As to damages, according to art. 81(1) CISG, art. 7.4.1 UNIDROIT Principles, and art. 8:102
PECL, the fact that a party has resorted to the avoidance remedy does not deprive him of his right
to claim damages (unless, under art. 7.4.1 UNIDROIT Principles and art. 8:101(2) and 8:108
PECL, the non-performance at the due date would have been excused).
Regarding the issue of computation of damages, art. 74 CISG provides that ” damages for breach
of contract by one party consist of a sum equal to the loss, including loss of profit, suffered by the
other party as a consequence of the breach. Such damages may not exceed the loss which the party
in breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract, in the
light of the facts and matters of which he then knew or ought to have known, as a possible
consequence of the breach of contract.”  Although not expressly stated, the principle of full
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compensation is an underlying principle of the CISG.223 This principle is laid down in art. 7.4.2(1)
UNIDROIT Principles and art. 9:502 PECL. Furthermore, the foreseeability test contained in
art. 74 CISG is also an element taken into account in the two sets of non-binding Principles,
under art. 9:504 PECL, respectively art. 7.4.4 UNIDROIT Principles. Nevertheless, whereas the
CISG loosely requires that the loss be foreseen as a ” possible consequence”  of the breach, under
the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL, the loss suffered must be a ” likely result”  of the non-
performance. Thus, ” there is a distinct difference in the wording resulting in a different standard
to be applied by the CISG, on the one hand, and the [UNIDROIT Principles] and PECL, on the
other hand. Hence, the [UNIDROIT Principles] and the PECL cannot serve as a persuasive
authority to clarify a real question concerning a matter which, despite being expressly settled in the
Convention, arguably remains ambiguous.” 224
To the question whether the amount of damages should be reduced by any advantage from which
the creditor benefited as a result of the debtor’s breach, art. 7.4.2(1) UNIDROIT Principles brings
a positive answer. The CISG and the PECL provide no express rule governing the issue.
Nevertheless, the Official Commentary on art. 9:502 PECL clearly points out that ” the aggrieved
party must bring into account in reduction of damages any compensating gains which offset [his]
loss.” 225 In the context of the CISG, the answer is generally affirmative on the basis of the
principle of full compensation, and ” the mechanisms of both PECL and [UNIDROIT Principles]
can be used as persuasive authority in confirming the solution predominantly favored under the
regime of the CISG.” 226
6. Art. 72 CISG –  A Provision Aiming at Protecting the Interests of One Party or at
Penalizing the Behavior of the Other?
Art. 72 CISG is the successor of art. 76 ULIS, which provided that ” where prior to the date fixed
for performance of the contract it is clear that one of the parties will commit a fundamental
breach of the contract, the other party shall have the right to declare the contract avoided.”  Art. 72
CISG is the only provision of the Convention which authorizes the buyer and the seller to avoid
the contract for fundamental breach by the other party before the time for performance by the
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latter party has elapsed. It thus complements arts. 49 and 64 CISG, which authorize the buyer,
respectively the seller, to avoid the contract when performance is overdue.
Art. 72(1) CISG’s primary purpose is to protect the interests of the party for whom it has become
objectively ” clear,”  after the conclusion of the contract, that the other party will commit a
fundamental breach. Indeed, this provision allows the former to terminate the contract and thus
avoid the losses he would have suffered, had he performed his own obligations and waited until
the date agreed upon for the other party’s performance, and had this other party failed to perform
his obligations. Furthermore, art. 72(2) CISG protects ” the interests of a party who has reason to
believe that the other will be unable or unwilling to perform the contract at the due date but who
cannot or may be reluctant to terminate the contract immediately in case it transpires that the
other party would after all have performed. Consequently, it enables a party who reasonably
believes that there will be a fundamental non-performance by the other party to demand an
assurance of performance from the other party and in the meantime to withhold [his] own
performance.” 227
In addition, considering art. 72(3) CISG, one may conclude that art. 72 CISG was also drafted to
prevent the party who regrets having entered the contractual relationship, from declaring himself
discharged from his obligations or from acting as if he were released from his contractual
obligations. In this perspective, art. 72 CISG also serves as a legal basis for penalizing the party
who repudiates the contract. Indeed, if one party repudiates the contract, the other party need not
give him reasonable notice of his intent prior to declaring the contract avoided. Consequently, the
law does not grant to the party who repudiates the contract the possibility to provide adequate
assurance of performance –  or merely to declare that he has changed his mind, i.e., that he is
willing and capable of performing his obligation –  and thus to prevent the avoidance of the
contract. Therefore, even if the party who declared that he would not perform the contract
changes his mind and eventually performs his obligations in compliance with the terms of the
contract, the other party may not be held liable for having declared the contract avoided. Indeed,
in case of repudiation of the contract by the obligor, ” the obligee does not have to wait and see
whether the obligor changes his mind; he can avoid the contract immediately. In such a case, the
declaration of an intended non-performance of the contract is irrevocable.” 228 In other words, if
a party repudiates the contract, he bears the risk that the contract be at any time avoided.
Consequently, ” where A’s avoidance responds to B’s wrongful repudiation and therefore is clearly
justified (art. 72(3)), A’s declaration of avoidance makes it possible for A to resell (or repurchase)
the goods called for by the initial contract; A need not be concerned lest B change [his] mind and
tender performance.” 229
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230 Secretariat Commentary on art. 64 of the 1978 Draft [draft counterpart of art. 73 CISG], available online at
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<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/999887i1.html> (chemical substance); SWITZERLAND Hg. K. Zürich, 30 November
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(lambskin coats); GERMANY Schiedsgericht der Hamburger freundschaftlichen Arbitrage [Arbitral Tribunal], 29
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SPAIN Audiencia Provincial [Appellate Court] de Barcelona, 3 November 1997, 729/96-B (CLOUT case No. 246),
available online at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/971103s4.html> (manufactured springs); SWITZERLAND Hg. K.
Z ü r i c h ,  5  F e b r u a r y  1 9 9 7 ,  H G  9 5  0 3 4 7  ( C L O U T  c a s e  N o .  2 1 4 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  o n l i n e  a t
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970205s1.html> (sunflower oil); FRANCE Cour d'appel [CA] [Appeal Court]
G r e n o b l e ,  2 2  F e b r u a r y  1 9 9 5 ,  9 3 / 3 2 7 5  ( C L O U T  c a s e  N o .  1 5 4 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  o n l i n e  a t
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950222f1.html> (jeans); CHINA Chansha Intermediate Peoples' Court Economic
Chamber case No. 89, 18 September 1995, available online at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950918c1.html>
(molybdenum iron alloy); GERMANY LG Ellwangen, 21 August 1995, 1 KfH O 32/95, available online at
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950821g2.html> (peppers); ICC award No. 8128, 1995, available online at
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/958128i1.html> (chemical fertilizer).
231 SWITZERLAND Hg. K. Zürich, HG 950357, supra note 230.
232 Enderlein/Maskow, supra note 7, at 294; see also Bennett, supra note 121, at 534.
233 Thus, ” if a party commits a breach of contract, and the obligee wishes to draw conclusions for other contracts, he may
probably do so on the basis of article 72”  (Enderlein/Maskow, supra note 7, at 294).
234 Schlechtriem, supra note 9, at 96.
41
IV. ANTICIPATORY BREACH IN INSTALLMENT CONTRACTS
1. Introduction to Installment Contracts
” The contract calls for the delivery by installments if it requires or authorizes the delivery of goods
in separate lots.” 230 It is not necessary that the contract provide for delivery of similar goods (the
goods do not have to be fungible) at all times231 or that there be an agreement that the goods be
delivered on fixed dates. In fact, the contract may well provide for deliveries of various sorts of
goods or for partial deliveries; furthermore, instead of having contractually fixed dates for delivery,
the contract may allow that deliveries be asked for when needed.232
Art. 73 CISG is only applicable to contracts providing for the delivery of goods by installments.233
More particularly, art. 73 CISG ” is concerned with successive deliveries, not installment payments.
By analogy, however, article 73(2) can also apply to missed payments if they coincide with
installment deliveries …  Article 73(2) is also applicable to other breaches by the buyer, such as not
taking delivery of an installment.” 234
2. Purpose of the Rule
Art. 51 CISG grants to the buyer the right to partially avoid the contract, on the basis of arts. 46
to 50 CISG, ” if the seller delivers only a part of the goods or if only a part of the goods delivered
is in conformity with the contract.”  The second paragraph of the same provision further stipulates
that ” the buyer may declare the contract avoided in its entirety only if the failure to make delivery
completely or in conformity with the contract amounts to a fundamental breach of the contract.”
Thus, first, ” article 51 is not specifically directed at contracts which provide for deliveries of goods
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235 Trevor Bennett, Comments on Article 73, in Cesare Massimo Bianca & Michael Joachim Bonell, Commentary on the
International Sales –  The 1980 Vienna Sales Convention 531, 533 (Giuffrè 1987), available online at
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/bennett-bb73.html>.
236 Chengwei, supra note 11, § 10.1.
237 Bennett, supra note 235, at 533.
238 Bennett, supra note 235, at 534.
239 In the following decisions, the conditions of art. 73(2) CISG were considered satisfied and the aggrieved party entitled to
declare the contract avoided for future installments: FRANCE CA Grenoble, 93/3275, supra note 230, in which the buyer
assured the seller that he would resell the goods in South America, but sold the first installment in Spain, interfering with
the seller’s marketing there; the Court held that the fundamental breach committed by the buyer justified the seller’s
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by installments, that is, in separate lots.” 235 Instead, art. 51 CISG is applicable where the contract
intended the goods to be delivered as a whole, but the seller failed to deliver part of the goods or
delivered goods that were in part defective. Second, art. 51 CISG grants only to the buyer the right
to protect his interests in case of breach by the seller. Finally, art. 51 CISG does not address the
issue of anticipatory breach in installment contracts, but only governs the right to terminate the
part of the contract affected by the breach or the entire contract if the breach, even though
pertaining only to part of the goods that ought to be delivered, amounts to an actual fundamental
breach of the entire contract.
As far as installment contracts are concerned, art. 73(2) CISG deals specifically with the possibility
to avoid the contract with respect to future installments, if the breach of one installment indicates
” the probability of a breach of installment obligations not yet due.” 236 This article appears as a
necessary complement to art. 51 CISG: art. 73 CISG deals specifically with installment contracts
and grants rights to both the buyer and seller, except in paragraph (3).237
Paragraphs (1) and (3) of art. 73 CISG do not address situations of anticipatory breach and their
analysis is consequently beyond the scope of the present paper.
3. Grounds for Avoidance of Future Installments
According to art. 73(1) CISG, ” in the case of a contract for delivery of goods by installments, if the
failure of one party to perform any of his obligations in respect of any installment constitutes a
fundamental breach of contract with respect to that installment, the other party may declare the
contract avoided with respect to that installment.”  Art. 73(2) CISG further provides that if one
party’s failure to perform any of his obligations in respect of any installment gives the other party
good grounds to conclude that a breach in respect of installments not yet due will occur, the latter
may declare the contract avoided with regard to these future installments, provided that he does
so within a reasonable time. Thus, art. 73(2) CISG sets forth three cumulative conditions that
ought to be satisfied for the non-breaching party to be authorized to declare the contract avoided
with respect to future installments. First, a breach of contract with respect to any of the
installments must have occurred. Second, even though ” the failure itself is not required to
constitute a fundamental breach,” 238 it must give the non-breaching party ” good grounds to
conclude that a fundamental breach of contract will occur with respect to future installments.”  In
other words, there must be an anticipatory fundamental breach with respect to future
installments. Third, the declaration of avoidance with respect to future installments must be made
” within a reasonable time of the failure to perform”  (this third condition will be addressed infra
III.4.).239
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avoidance of the contract for future installments; GERMANY LG Ellwangen, 1 KfH O 32/95, supra note 230, in which
the buyer had good grounds to believe that the seller would be unable to deliver peppers that satisfied food safety
regulations; SWITZERLAND Hg. K. Zürich, HG 95 0347, supra note 230, in which the seller made no delivery despite
taking payment; SWITZERLAND ZHK Arbitral award No. 273/95, supra note 22, in which the seller failed to deliver the
first installment; GERMANY Schiedsgericht der Hamburger freundschaftlichen Arbitrage, supra note 230, in which the
seller stated that he would not make further deliveries; HUNGARY Arbitration Court attached to the Hungarian
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Arbitral award in case No. VB/97142, 25 May 1999 (CLOUT case No. 265),
available online at <http://www.uncitral.org/english/clout/MAL-thesaurus/MAL-abstract266-e.htm>, in which the seller
refused to deliver further cherries because of a dramatic increase in the market price for the cherries; SPAIN Audiencia
Provincial de Barcelona, 729/96-B, supra note 230, in which late delivery of three installments caused disruption of the
buyer's production; ICC award No. 9887, supra note 230, in which the seller delivered poor quality goods.
240 Enderlein/Maskow, supra note 7, at 296; Bennett, supra note 235, at 536 et seq.
241 Bennett, supra note 235, at 536-537.
242 Chengwei, supra note 11, § 10.2.
243 Enderlein/Maskow, supra note 7, at 296; Bennett, supra note 235, at 535.
244 Bennett, supra note 235, at 534-535.
245 Vilus, supra note 7, at 246-247. In the following cases, it was found that the seller had good grounds to avoid the contract:
HUNGARY Arbitration award No. VB/94124, supra note 37, in which the failure to open a letter of credit gave good
grounds to conclude that the buyer would not pay; FRANCE CA Grenoble, 93/3275, supra note 230, in which the buyer
would continue to breach a contract term that prohibited the buyer from reselling the goods in specified markets. In
CHINA International Economic & Trade Arbitration Commission, Arbitral award CISG/1996/01, 18 September 1996,
available online at <http://www.cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960918cl.html>, the Arbitral Tribunal held that, even though
the buyer had not opened the letter of credit pertaining to the first installment within the time-frame set by the contract,
given that he had clearly expressed his intention to open the letter of credit pertaining to the second installment and that
he had not indicated any intention to decline to open the letters of credit for the remaining installments, the seller wrongly
considered that there was an ” anticipatory breach of contract.”
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According to the first condition, a breach of contract with respect to any of the installments must
have occurred. Thus, in contrast with the conditions of suspension and avoidance under arts. 71
and 72 CISG, neither a deficiency in the ability to perform or in the creditworthiness, nor a
declaration of an intention not to perform is sufficient240 for the conditions of art. 73(2) CISG to
be satisfied. ” It is doubtful whether the grounds [that allow the non-breaching party to conclude
that a fundamental breach will occur] can derive from, say, the bankruptcy of the other party or a
statement by him that he does not intend to perform his obligations with respect to future
installments. In such a case the appropriate course would be to proceed under article 72, if it is
otherwise applicable.” 241 Thus, as far as future installments are concerned, art. 73(2) CISG does
not support the view that a party’s refusal to perform constitutes, in itself, a fundamental
breach.242 It is however not required that the failure itself constitute a fundamental breach. A
mere breach may also lead to the conclusion that a fundamental breach will be committed in the
future.243 Indeed, ” a breach which is not by itself fundamental may in its context, for example, a
series of such breaches over a period of time, provide the necessary ground for concluding that a
fundamental breach will occur. Nor is it a condition precedent to the applicability of the
paragraph that avoidance action has been taken for the installment in which the failure
occurred.” 244
The second condition, namely the condition that the failure by one party to perform any of his
obligations in respect of any installment give the non-breaching party ” good grounds to conclude
that a fundamental breach of contract will occur with respect to future installments”  is an
application, to installment contracts, of art. 72 CISG regarding anticipatory breaches.245 However,
the terms ” good grounds to conclude”  set a less onerous and more subjective standard for
avoidance than the objective standard of certainty that must be reached under art. 72 CISG,
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<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ho73.html>; see also Chengwei, supra note 11, § 10.1.
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Draft and the current art. 73 indicates that the two provisions are substantively the same.
248 Secretariat Commentary on Art. 64 of the 1978 Draft, supra note 230, § 6.
249 Bennett, supra note 235, at 534.
250 Flechtner, supra note 101.
251 Chengwei, supra note 11, § 10.2.
252 Enderlein/Maskow, supra note 7, at 296.
253 In SPAIN Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona, 729/96-B, supra note 230, the buyer who was entitled to avoid the contract as
to future installments effectively avoided the contract when it gave notice to the seller within 48 hours of the third late delivery.
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according to which it must be ” clear”  that a fundamental breach of contract will be committed.246
The Secretariat expressly pointed out that ” it should be noted that article 64(2) [draft counterpart
of CISG article 73(2)] permits the avoidance of the contract in respect of future performance of an
installment contract even though it is not ‘clear’ that there will be a fundamental breach of the
contract in the future as would be required by art. 63 [draft counterpart of CISG article 72].” 247
” The test of the right to avoid under article 64(2) [draft counterpart of CISG article 73(2)] is
whether a failure to perform in respect of an installment gives the other party good reason to fear
that there will be a fundamental breach in respect of future installments. The test does not look
to the seriousness of the current breach. This is of particular significance where a series of
breaches, none of which in itself is fundamental or would give good reason to fear a future
fundamental breach, taken together does give good reason for such fear” 248 (for a more detailed
comparative analysis of art. 72 and 73(2) CISG, see infra IV.6.)
4. Declaration of Avoidance Within a Reasonable Period of Time
The condition according to which the creditor of the obligation must declare the contract avoided
for the future within a reasonable period of time lacks clarity. First, it does not specify when the
reasonable period of time starts running. Second, it does not define according to which
parameters the period of time must be ” reasonable.”
As to the first issue, some commentators have advocated that the reasonable period of time starts
running at the time of the occurrence of the failure to perform by the breaching party.249 One
could also imagine that the reasonable period of time should start at the time the aggrieved party
discovers (or could have discovered) the breach. However, these solutions are problematic in cases
in which it is not a specific event of non-performance but a series of non-conforming installments
that constitute ” good grounds to conclude that a fundamental breach of contract will occur,”  as
well as in cases in which the past non-performance(s) involved non-delivery. Consequently, an
appropriate solution seems to be to consider that the reasonable period of time starts running
when the creditor of the obligation has acquired ” good grounds”  indicating that a fundamental
breach will be committed.250 ” Such a standard is very uncertain, but it offers the only hope for
dealing with the variety of circumstances that will arise.” 251
As to the parameters that ought to be taken into account to determine the period of time which
is ” reasonable,”  ” the length of the interval between the latest and the next installment and/or its
reception and payment” 252 should be taken into account.253
The declaration of avoidance is subject to art. 27 CISG.
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254 Under art. 9:302 PECL, it is appropriate to allow the aggrieved party to terminate in relation to the non-performed unit
without affecting the rest of the contract, if the non-performance that has occurred is fundamental precisely regarding that
specific ” unit”  of the contract, if the unit not performed does not affect the rest of the contract significantly, and if the
non-performance is not likely to be repeated (Commission on European Contract Law, Comment and Notes on PECL 9:302,
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European Contract Law, available online at <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/
peclcomp51.html>).
256 Bennett, supra note 235, at 536-537.
257 Bennett, supra note 235, at 534.
258 Honnold, supra note 7, at 443.
259 Chengwei, supra note 11, § 10.2.
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5. Impact of the CISG on Subsequent Uniform Sets of Principles
No counterpart to art. 73(2) CISG is found in the UNIDROIT Principles, which simply do not
address the issue of anticipatory breaches in installment contracts. As regards the PECL, a priori,
art. 9:302 seems to be the corresponding provision of art. 73 CISG, rather than that of art. 51
CISG. More precisely, art. 9:302 ab initio PECL seems to be the counterpart of art. 73(1) CISG,254
and art. 9:302 in fine PECL seems to correspond to art. 73(3) CISG.255 However, neither of these
two provisions of the PECL addresses the issue of anticipatory breach in installment contracts.
6. Relationship Between General Principles Regarding Anticipatory Breach and
Anticipatory Breach in Installment Contracts
Art. 72 and art. 73(2) CISG both govern situations of anticipatory breach. However, whereas the
former authorizes avoidance of the entire contract, the latter provides for avoidance, in installment
contracts, ” for the future.”  Furthermore, the conditions of avoidance set forth by art. 72 CISG
differ from those of art. 73(2) CISG. First, whereas art. 72 CISG applies only if it is ” clear”  that a
fundamental breach of contract will be committed, art. 73(2) CISG merely requires that there be
” good grounds to conclude that a fundamental breach of contract will occur.”  Second, whereas
art. 72 CISG does not specify the circumstances that may lead to the conclusion that it is ” clear”
that a fundamental breach will be committed, art. 72(3) CISG requires that the suspected
fundamental breach ” have been preceded by, and indeed derived from, an actual failure to
perform obligations.” 256 Thus, under art. 73 CISG, ” avoidance in respect of [future] installments
is dependant on an anticipatory breach of contract the occurrence of which is not required to be
” clear”  as it is in article 72.” 257
The rationale underlying the difference of standard in the conditions of avoidance set by the two
said articles is the following: in the context of the application of art. 73(2) CISG, a breach of
contract has already been committed;258 thus, one party has already violated one of his obligations
with respect to one installment and this, in particular, constitutes a ground for the assumption
that a fundamental breach will occur (some scholars call this ” non-reliance approach based on an
actual breach” 259). In other words, art. 73(2) CISG takes into consideration the fact that,
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legitimately, the innocent party might no longer be able to rely on the other party’s commitment,
given the breach that has already occurred. Under this article, even if the debtor provides adequate
assurance of performance, the creditor remains entitled to declare the contract avoided with
respect to future installments if a breach has already been committed. Conversely, ” neither the
[debtor]’s failure to provide adequate assurance of performance on demand due to a deterioration
of creditworthiness, nor his declaration that he will not perform, [alone,] give the [creditor] the
right to avoid the contract. An actual failure to perform must instead be the basis for avoidance of
future installments.” 260
One similarity between art. 72 and art. 73(2) CISG is, nevertheless, that in neither article does the
law provide details regarding the degree of clarity or the strength of the grounds that may lead a
party to believe that a fundamental breach will be committed, nor does the law describe the acts
or circumstances that may cause or result in a fundamental breach of contract by one party.
A final distinction between art. 72 and art. 73(2) CISG must be pointed out: unlike art. 72 CISG,
art. 73(2) CISG does not require that the declaration of avoidance be preceded by a notice of
intention to the other party; rather, it is necessary, under art. 73(2) CISG, that the declaration of
avoidance be made ” within a reasonable time,”  ” a requirement which is not included in article 72
at least in express terms.” 261
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In view of the above analysis, one must conclude that arts. 71, 72, and 73(2) CISG bear witness to
the fact that ” the Convention aims at preserving the parties’ commitments and at favoring the
performance of their agreement, thus relying on a general principle of favor contractus.” 262 More
particularly, these provisions, pertaining to the issue of anticipatory breach of contract, may be
counted among those contributing to one of the main purposes of the CISG, namely to allow
performance of international sales contracts, even if such performance is imperfect, by inducing
” the party in breach to spontaneously cure.” 263 It is only in the exceptional situations in which it
is clear that a fundamental breach will be committed, and generally only if the author of the future
breach fails to provide adequate assurance of performance, that the other party –  the innocent
party –  is authorized to declare the contract avoided.
Under art. 71 CISG, if it becomes apparent that one party will not perform a substantial part of
his obligation, the other party may suspend performance of his obligations, ” thus stimulating the
breaching party’s cure, though at the same time preventing the harshness of post-avoidance
restitutions.” 264 The innocent party is however compelled to restore performance if the other party
provides adequate assurance of performance. Such assurance may be considered adequate even if
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it shows that performance might not be complete and perfect. Furthermore, the failure, by one
party, to provide adequate assurance of performance does not constitute, in itself, a fundamental
breach, and consequently does not authorize the other party to declare the contract avoided. In
turn, the conditions that ought to be satisfied, under art. 72 CISG, for the innocent party to be
entitled to declare the contract avoided, are more onerous than those of art. 71 CISG. They
require that the future occurrence of the breach be objectively ” clear”  (rather than just ” apparent” )
and that the suspected breach be of fundamental nature. Furthermore, in the case of art. 72
CISG, the innocent party must give notice to the other party prior to the declaration of avoidance,
in order to allow the latter party to provide adequate assurance of performance. Finally, art. 73(2)
CISG allows the avoidance of the contract for the future only if ” one party’s failure to perform any
of his obligations in respect of any installment gives the other party good grounds to conclude that
a fundamental breach of contract will occur with respect to future installments.”
It stems from the comparative analyses conducted in chapters II, III, and IV that due to the
” substantial, even pervasive” 265 influence of the CISG, the remedial systems of the UNIDROIT
Principles and the PECL were also founded on the general principle that termination of the
contract should be available to the aggrieved party in a limited number of cases, and only if the
other party has committed or will commit a fundamental non-performance. Furthermore, in the
absence of suspected fundamental non-performance, these two sets of Principles do not grant any
protection to the innocent party. Finally, neither of these two sets of Principles addresses the issue
of anticipatory breach in installment contracts; thus, even if the commission of a fundamental
breach is suspected, the innocent party has no right to declare the contract avoided for future
installments.
The remedial systems of the CISG, the UNIDROIT Principles, and the PECL are founded on a
basic dichotomy regarding ” the standard that parties have to comply with in order to satisfactorily
perform the obligations stemming from the contract that they are bound to. This issue may be
addressed either in positive terms, thus analyzing what the debtor is required to do in order to be
discharged from his obligations, or in negative terms, by way of focusing on what degree of lack of
performance triggers negative legal consequences for the non-performing party.” 266 If the law
imposes on the debtor a standard of perfect tender, any ” mere breach”  will entitle the creditor to
seek avoidance of the contract. On the other hand, if, to satisfy the requirements of the law, the
debtor is merely compelled to offer substantial performance, only ” a fundamental breach”  will
allow the creditor to seek avoidance of the contract.
The provisions of the CISG, the UNIDROIT Principles, and the PECL relating to the issue of
anticipatory breach authorize the avoidance of the contract only if the breach suspected is of
fundamental nature. This indicates that the standard that the parties have to comply with in order
to satisfactorily perform their obligations is a standard of substantial performance rather than a
one of perfect tender. Indeed, even if the debtor has not fulfilled perfectly all of his obligations,
avoidance of the contract is prohibited, so long as the breach is not fundamental. Similarly, the
creditor of an obligation is prohibited from suspending performance of his obligations if assurance
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of performance has been provided by the debtor, even if such assurance indicates that the
performance will not be perfect, so long as the imperfection is insubstantial, that is, so long as the
assurance provided indicates that the debtor will comply with substantial performance standards.
” While this …  solution reduces the possibility of strategic behavior on the part of the creditor,267
it enhances that of strategic behavior on the part of the debtor, who may opportunistically perform
his obligation in a way that, although substantially fulfilling the required standard, ranges below
the average standard performance.” 268 Nevertheless, one may conclude that this solution favors the
performance of the contract by limiting the right to avoid the contract and thus promotes good
faith and efficiency in international commercial transactions.
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